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Introduction
Why care about what emergence is, and whether there is any? To start, many complex
entities of our acquaintance—tornados, plants, people and the like—appear to be com-
posed of less complex entities, and to have features which depend, one way or another,
on features of their composing entities. Yet such complex entities also appear to be to
some extent autonomous, both ontologically and causally, from the entities upon which
they depend. Moreover, and more specifically, many ‘higher-level’ entities (particulars,
systems, processes) treated by the special sciences appear to be broadly synchronically
dependent on ‘lower-level’ (and ultimately fundamental physical) entities.1 Yet, as is sug-
gested by the associated special science laws, many higher-level entities appear also to be
ontologically and causally autonomous, in having features in virtue of which they are dis-
tinct from and distinctively efficacious relative to the lower-level entities upon which they
depend, even taking into account that the latter stand in configurational or aggregative
relations. An account of emergence making sense of these appearances would vindicate
and illuminate both our experience and the existence and tree-like structure of the spe-
cial sciences, as treating distinctively real and efficacious higher-level entities and their
features.
Reflecting these motivations, nearly all accounts of emergence take this to involve both
∗Thanks to Benj Hellie, an anonymous referee for this collection, students in my seminars on emergence
at the University of Toronto, and members of audiences at the many talks on different aspects of emergence
that I have given over the past decade, for helping to shape and improve my views on this topic.
†Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto; jessica.m.wilson@utoronto.ca
1Talk of ‘higher-level’ and ‘lower-level’ entities is relative, and reflects the pre-theoretic and theoretic
appearances. Here I treat as at the same ‘level’ both individual entities treated by a given science, and
certain combinations of such entities, where the allowable modes of combination include aggregations
of relations which may hold between individual entities, as well as mereological and certain boolean
combinations of such individuals or relational entities. So, for example, both atoms and relational entities
consisting of atoms standing in atomic relations are taken to be at the same level, as are mereological or
disjunctive combinations of atoms or relational atomic entities.
1
broadly synchronic dependence2 and (some measure of) ontological and causal autonomy.3
Beyond this agreement, however, accounts of emergence diverge into a bewildering vari-
ety, reflecting that the core notions of dependence and autonomy have multiple, often
incompatible interpretations.
In particular: candidate conceptions of (broadly) synchronic dependence include com-
position (Mill 1843/1973, Stephan 2002); supervenience/necessitation (Broad 1925, van
Cleve 1990, Kim 2006); causation or causal constitution (Mill 1843/1973, Searle 1992,
O’Connor and Wong 2005); and functional or other realization (Antony and Levine
1997, Yablo 1992, Shoemaker 2000, Gillett 2002a). Candidate conceptions of ontolog-
ical and causal autonomy are even more various. Metaphysical accounts of autonomy
include ontological irreducibility (Silberstein and McGeever 1999, Kim 2006); novelty
(Anderson 1972, Humphreys 1996); fundamentality—e.g., of properties, powers, forces,
laws (the British Emergentists, Cunningham 2001, O’Connor 2002, Wilson 2002, Barnes
2012); non-additivity (the British Emergentists, Newman 1996, Bedau 1997, Silberstein
and McGeever 1999); ‘downward’ causal efficacy (Sperry 1986, Searle 1992, Klee 1984,
Schroder 1998); multiple realizability (Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974, Klee 1984, Shoemaker
2000, Wimsatt 1996); and elimination in degrees of freedom (Wilson 2010b). And episte-
mological accounts of autonomy include in-principle failure of deducibility or predictability
(Broad 1925 and other British Emergentists, Klee 1984); predictability, but only by simu-
lation (Newman 1996, Bedau 1997); and lack of conceptual or representational entailment
(Chalmers 1996, Van Gulick 2001). No surprise, then, that many recent articles on emer-
gence are devoted mainly to taxonomizing its many varieties (Klee 1984, Van Gulick 2001,
Stephan 2002).
Though in general a thousand flowers may fruitfully bloom, this much diversity is
2Some accounts of emergence present this as diachronic, but most such accounts can be translated
into synchronic terms, and those that cannot are aimed at characterizing single-level, not higher-level,
emergence, and so can be put aside here. Mill (1843/1973) suggests that certain (‘heteropathic’) effects
emerge from temporally prior causes, but also suggests that entities having powers to produce such effects
synchronically emerge from lower-level entities (see §3.3.1). O’Connor (1994) and O’Connor and Wong
(2005) take emergence to be diachronic, on grounds that emergent features are caused by lower-level
features (sometimes in combination with other emergent features), and causation is diachronic; but here
again diachronic emergence can be understood in terms of the synchronic emergence of features having the
powers to produce the effects in question, and in any case the essentials of a causal account of dependence
are preserved whether or not (the relevant) causation is synchronic (see §2.3). And Rueger (2001) takes
emergence to be diachronic since involving temporally extended processes; but the emergence of such
processes is compatible with these ‘synchronically’ depending on a temporally extended base (compare
spatiotemporally global supervenience). Humphreys (1997) characterizes an irreducibly diachronic emer-
gence, involving the exhaustive (non-mereological) ‘fusion’ of lower-level entities into another lower-level
entity; but such emergence is besides the point of accommodating the existence of higher-level entities.
3These core components are occasionally explicitly flagged (see Bedau 1997), but more typically are
encoded in specific accounts of dependence and autonomy, as when Kim (2006, 548) says “two [. . . ] neces-
sary components of any concept of emergence that is true to its historical origins [. . . ] are supervenience
and irreducibility”. Here and throughout I distinguish ontological autonomy (distinctness) from causal
autonomy (distinctive efficacy), and I assume that both are required of an account of metaphysical emer-
gence aiming to vindicate special science entities as entering into distinctive (typically causal) laws; this
assumption also reflects that causal as well as ontological autonomy is constitutive of the distinctively
emergentist responses to the problem of higher-level causation that we will later consider. Of course,
causal autonomy entails ontological autonomy, by Leibniz’s law. Ontological autonomy is compatible
with an absence of causal autonomy, however, as with epiphenomenalist accounts of higher-level entities;
correspondingly, though epiphenomenalist accounts are occasionally presented as accounts of ‘emergence’
(see Chalmers 2006), they are not so in the sense at issue here.
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unuseful for purposes of illuminating the structure of natural reality. Different accounts
often disagree on whether an entity is emergent; and when they agree, there is often no
clear basis for this agreement. Hence it is said that references to emergence “seem to have
no settled meaning” (Byrne 1994, 206), that accounts of emergence are “not obviously rec-
oncilable with one another” (O’Connor 1994, 91), and that “those discussing emergence,
even face to face, more often than not talk past each other” (Kim 2006, 548). More-
over, and importantly for the relevance of emergence to contemporary debate, different
accounts often disagree over whether emergence is compatible with Physicalism, according
to which all broadly scientific entities are ‘nothing over and above’ physical entities. So,
to take just one example, Kim 1999 takes physical realization to be incompatible with
emergence, while Gillett 2002b takes such realization to be required.
I’ll argue here that much of this apparent diversity is superficial. I’ll start by show-
ing, by attention to the available responses to the problem of higher-level causation, that
there are two and only two schematic conceptions of higher-level metaphysical emergence
of broadly scientific entities: Strong and Weak emergence, respectively (§1). The two
schemas are similar in each imposing a condition on the powers of entities taken to be
emergent, relative to the powers of their base entities. For purposes of appreciating the
generality of the schemas, it is of the first importance to register that the notion of ‘power’
here is metaphysically almost entirely neutral, reflecting commitment just to the plausible
thesis that what causes an entity may potentially bring about (perhaps only contingently)
are associated with how the entity is—that is, with its features.4 As I’ll discuss, even a
categoricalist contingentist Humean could accept powers in the weak sense at issue in the
schemas. Though similar in each involving a condition on powers, the schemas are also
crucially different—a difference reflected in the fact that (given the physical acceptability
of the lower-level entities) one schema is compatible with Physicalism and the other is
not. (The results here generalize to distinguish two basic forms of higher-level emergence
from lower-level entities, whether or not the latter are physically acceptable.) I will then
consider the main accounts of emergent dependence (§2) and emergent autonomy (§3 and
§4), and argue that all such accounts intended as characterizing metaphysical emergence
are appropriately interpreted as targeting one or the other schema. The two schemas
thus unify and clarify the many apparently diverse accounts of higher-level metaphysi-
cal emergence, while explaining controversy over whether emergence is compatible with
Physicalism.
Others have observed that accounts of emergence may be broadly sorted into ‘weak’
and ‘strong’ varieties, that are and are not compatible with Physicalism, respectively; see,
for example, Smart 1981, Bedau 1997, Chalmers 2006, and Clayton 2006. My powers-
based treatment (the key features of which were first proposed in Wilson 19995) goes
beyond these (typically gestural) treatments in explicitly cashing the distinction between
Weak and Strong emergence in metaphysical rather than epistemological terms, in more
specifically identifying the differing schematic metaphysical bases for these two types of
emergence, and in explicitly locating the schemas in a representative spectrum of existing
accounts of emergent dependence and emergent autonomy. My treatment also goes beyond
previous taxonomic descriptions of the varieties of emergence, in that the schemas for
4Here and elsewhere, nominalists are invited to interpret talk of features (properties, states) in their
preferred terms.
5See note 13 for discussion of the genesis of this treatment.
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Weak and Strong emergence arguably exhaust the available ways in which higher-level,
broadly scientific entities might synchronically metaphysically emerge from lower-level
such entities, and in that identification of what is key and crucial to such emergence
indicates that certain accounts have more work to do if they are to ensure satisfaction of
the conditions in the intended schema.
1 Two schemas for emergence
1.1 The target cases
Accounts of emergence tend to focus on emergence of features (e.g., either tokens or types
of properties or states) from lower-level features, it being supposed (as per the background
contrast with substance dualism; see §2.1) that emergence of entities (systems, processes,
particulars) may be understood in terms of emergent features.6 The lower-level features
are typically taken to be physically acceptable relational features—that is, physically
acceptable features of relational lower-level (and ultimately physical) entities.7 So, for
example, a discussion of emergence might target the seeming autonomous dependence of:
∼ the higher-level property/state (of a complex system) of being in the basin of a
strange attractor, on the (lower-level, relational) property/state (of a system of
molecules) of having parts with certain positions and momenta.
∼ the property/state (of a plant) of being phototropic on the (lower-level, relational)
property (of the plant’s cellular walls) of being such as to undergo certain cellular
wall weakenings and cellular expansions.
∼ a mental property/state (of a person) on a (lower-level, relational) neurophysiolog-
ical property/state (of certain neurons standing in certain neuronal relations).
Emergence, as applying to such cases, is treated (multiple dependence or realizability
to one side) as a one-one relation between higher-level and lower-level features. This
treatment presupposes that certain relational lower-level entities exist and have features
serving as a dependence base for the associated emergent features. The presupposition
is useful, in encoding (as had by the posited lower-level relational entity) the sorts of
features of complex entities that are assumed by all parties not to be emergent, in any
interesting sense. Alternatively, one might (following Gillett 2002a) dispense with the
relational lower-level middleman and take the dependence base to consist in collections of
comparatively non-relational lower-level features (say, features of individual molecules and
pairwise relations between individual molecules), understood as combinable via certain
ontologically ‘lightweight’ compositional principles, including additive causal combination
(see §3.3), and certain boolean or mereological operations (see fn.1 and §3.5). In any case,
it’s clear that the ‘one-one’ and ‘many-one’ approaches target the same phenomena: the
6Hence Bedau (2002, 6) says: “[A]n entity with an emergent property is an emergent entity and an
emergent phenomenon involves an emergent entity possessing an emergent property—and they all can be
traced back to the notion of an emergent property.”
7‘Physically acceptable’ here refers to entities and features that are (taken to be, in some or other
sense) ‘nothing over and above’ physical entities and features, where physical entities and features are,
roughly and commonly, the relatively non-complex, not-fundamentally-mental entities and features that
are the proper subject matter of fundamental physics (see Wilson 2006).
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latter considers the nature of the dependence of a higher-level entity on comparatively
non-relational lower-level entities given certain allowable combinatorial principles, whereas
the former considers the nature of the dependence of a higher-level entity on relational
lower-level entities having features allowed by the combinatorial principles. By default
I’ll take the one-one perspective, but as we’ll see some accounts of emergent dependence
and autonomy take the many-one perspective.
1.2 The problem of higher-level causation
The primary challenge to the claim that higher-level entities and features may be meta-
physically emergent—dependent on, yet also distinct from and distinctively efficacious
with respect to, configurations of lower-level entities and features—is posed by the prob-
lem of higher-level causation, articulated most prominently by Jaegwon Kim.8 This prob-
lem starts with a question: how can special science entities cause effects, given their strong
synchronic dependence on lower-level (ultimately physical) entities? And the initial press-
ing concern is that, on the face of it, no answer satisfies all of certain intuitive or otherwise
well-motivated premises.
First, some setup. Following common practice, I assume that the efficacy of entities
lies in their having efficacious features; talk of entities themselves is thus suppressed.
Moreover, given that causation is in the first instance a relation between spatiotemporally
located goings-on, reference to ‘features’ in what follows is to be understood as reference
to spatiotemporally located tokens (e.g., property instances, states, events) potentially of
a type (property, state type, event type).9
Six premises lead to the problem.10 Four of these concern special science features:
1. Dependence. Special science features depend on lower-level physically acceptable
features (henceforth, ‘base features’) in that, at a minimum, special science features
(at least nomologically) require and are (at least nomologically) necessitated by base
features.
2. Reality. Both special science features and their base features are real.
3. Efficacy. Special science features are efficacious.
4. Distinctness. Special science features are distinct from their base features.
And two concern causation:
5. Physical Causal Closure. Every lower-level physically acceptable effect has a purely
lower-level physically acceptable cause.
6. Non-overdetermination. Apart from ‘firing squad’ cases, effects are not causally
overdetermined.
8See, e.g., Kim 1989, 1993a, 1998, and 2005.
9That said, I will sometimes gloss the type/token distinction—e.g., when discussing necessitation of
features, below.
10What follows reflects my preferred way of presenting the problem and slate of candidate resolutions, as
set out in Wilson 1999, 2011, and elsewhere. Kim’s own presentations more specifically target motivating
reductive over non-reductive versions of physicalism, via denial of the fourth premise (Distinctness.
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On to the problem. There are two cases to consider, in each of which a special science
feature S depends, on a given occasion, on base feature P (Dependence). There are two
cases to consider: one in which special science feature S is assumed to cause a special
science feature S*, and one in which S is assumed to cause a lower-level physical feature
P∗. In Kim’s classic presentation, S is taken to be a mental feature (e.g., a token state of
being thirsty); P is taken to be a lower-level (neurological, and ultimately fundamental
physical) physically acceptable feature upon which mental state S depends, on a given
occasion; and mental state S is taken to cause either another mental state S* (e.g.,
a desire to quench one’s thirst) or a lower-level physically acceptable state P* (e.g., a
physical reaching for a glass of water). But the considerations about to be raised more
generally apply to raise a concern about how any real and distinct higher-level feature
might be unproblematically efficacious.
First, suppose that S causes special science feature S* on a given occasion (compatible
with Efficacy). S* is dependent on some base feature P* (Dependence), such that P∗
necessitates S*, with at least nomological necessity. Moreover, P* has a purely lower-
level physically acceptable cause (Physical Causal Closure)—plausibly, and without loss
of generality, P . If P causes P*, and P* (at least nomologically) necessitates S*, then
it is plausible that P causes S*, by causing P∗. So, it appears, both P and S cause
S*, and given that P and S are both real and distinct (Reality, Distinctness), S* is
causally overdetermined; moreover (given Dependence) this overdetermination is not of
the firing-squad variety (contra Non-overdetermination).
Second, suppose that S causes some base feature P* on a given occasion (compatible
with Efficacy). P* has a purely lower-level physically acceptable cause (Physical Causal
Closure)—plausibly, and without loss of generality, P . So, it appears, both P and S cause
P*, and given that P and S are both real and distinct (by Reality and Distinctness), P*
is causally overdetermined; moreover (given Dependence) this overdetermination is not of
the firing-squad variety (contra non-Overdetermination).
So goes the argument that real, distinct and efficacious higher-level features induce
problematic overdetermination. Kim sees the argument as motivating rejection of the
premise that special science features are distinct from their base features—that is, he
goes for reductionism. For present purposes, however, it is useful to more generally note
that rejection of each of the premises of the (valid) argument is associated with one or
other fairly comprehensive position in the metaphysics of science. The first four are as
follows:
∼ Substance dualism or Pan/proto-psychism. Deny Dependence: avoid overdetermi-
nation by denying that S depends on physically acceptable P .
∼ Eliminativism. Deny Realism: avoid overdetermination by denying that S and/or
S* is real.
∼ Epiphenomenalism. Deny Efficacy : avoid overdetermination by denying that S is
efficacious.
∼ Reductive physicalism. Deny Distinctness: avoid overdetermination by denying that
S is distinct from P .
None of these strategies makes sense of the seeming emergence of higher-level features:
Substance dualism and Pan/proto-psychism fail to accommodate dependence; Elimina-
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tivism and Reductive physicalism fail to accommodate ontological autonomy; Epiphenom-
enalism and, some think, Reductive physicalism, fail to accommodate causal autonomy.
1.3 The two ‘emergentist’ strategies
The remaining strategies do better by way of accommodating emergence. These are:
∼ Strong emergentism. Deny Physical Causal Closure: avoid overdetermination by
denying that every lower-level physically acceptable effect has a purely lower-level
physically acceptable cause.
∼ Non-reductive physicalism. Deny Non-overdetermination: allow that there is overde-
termination, but deny that it is of the firing squad variety that would be intuitively
problematic as generally characterizing higher-level causation.
I’ll now argue, for each of these strategies, that the strategy may be perspicuously un-
derstood as imposing one or another condition on the causal powers (henceforth, just
‘powers’) of a given special science feature, and that satisfaction of the associated condi-
tion provides a plausible principled basis for taking the feature to be emergent, in ways
that proponents of each strategy would endorse.
1.3.1 A metaphysically neutral understanding of powers
Before getting started, let us ask: What are powers? Here, talk of powers is simply
shorthand for talk of what causal contributions possession of a given feature makes (or
can make, relative to the same laws of nature) to an entity’s bringing about an effect,
when in certain circumstances. That features are associated with actual or potential
causal contributions (‘powers’) reflects the uncontroversial fact that what entities do (can
do, relative to the same laws of nature) depends on how they are (what features they
have). So, for example, a magnet attracts nearby pins in virtue of being magnetic, not
massy; a magnet falls to the ground when dropped in virtue of being massy, not magnetic.
Moreover, a feature may contribute to diverse effects, given diverse circumstances of its
occurrence (which circumstances may be internal or external to the entity possessing the
feature). Anyone accepting that what effects a particular causes (can cause, relative to
the same laws of nature) is in part a function of what features it has—effectively, all
participants to the present debate—is in position to accept powers, in this shorthand,
metaphysically neutral and nomologically motivated sense.11
Besides commitment to the platitude that what entities can do (cause), relative to
the same laws of nature, depends on how they are (what features they have), only one
metaphysical condition is required in order to make sense of the powers-based conditions
to follow; namely, that one’s account of (actual or potential) causal contributions (powers)
has resources sufficient to ground the identity (or non-identity) of a token causal contri-
bution associated with a token of a higher-level feature, with a token causal contribution
associated with a token of a lower-level feature. Here again, effectively all participants
11For example, even a contingentist categoricalist Humean can accept powers in the neutral sense here:
for such a Humean, to say that a (ultimately categorical) feature has a certain power would be to say that,
were a token of the feature to occur in certain circumstances, a certain (contingent) regularity would be
instanced. Of course, contemporary Humeans will implement more sophisticated variations on this theme.
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to the debate can make sense of such identity (non-identity) claims as applied to token
(actual or potential) causal contributions (token powers).12
Of course, beyond the neutral characterization of powers, understood as tracking the
nomologically determined causal contributions associated with a given feature, philoso-
phers disagree. It is of the first importance, in order to appreciate the generality of the
upcoming schemas for emergence, to see that no commitment to any controversial theses
about powers (or associated notions such as property or law) will be required payment in
what follows. Three key points of non-commitment, to be further defended in §1.3.3., are
worth highlighting.
First, nothing in what follows requires accepting that it is essential to features that
they have the powers they actually have. Maybe powers are essential to features; maybe
they aren’t. As we will shortly see, it suffices to characterize the strong emergentist and
non-reductive physicalist strategies, and associated schemas for emergence, that powers
are contingently had by the features at issue.
Second, nothing in what follows requires accepting that features are exhaustively in-
dividuated by powers. Maybe they are; maybe they aren’t: perhaps features are also or
ultimately individuated by quiddities or other non-causal aspects of features. In any case,
the presence or absence of quiddities, which primarily serve to locate actually instanced
features in worlds with different laws of nature, plays no role in actually individuating
broadly scientific features in either scientific theorizing or practice. As such, the pres-
ence or absence of non-causal aspects of the features at issue can play no interesting
role in a metaphysical account aiming to vindicate the scientific appearances supporting
higher-level emergence; and nor does it, in the schemas to come.
Third, nothing in what follows requires accepting that powers are or are not reducible
to categorical features, or that attributions of powers are or are not reducible to certain
conditionals or counterfactuals, etc. Maybe powers, or talk of them, are reducible to
other entities or terms; maybe they aren’t. Again, scientific theorizing and practice is
transparent to such further metaphysical details, and so too should be our associated
conceptions of emergence.
1.3.2 Strong emergentism
As above, strong emergentists maintain that some special science features are real, dis-
tinct, and distinctively efficacious as compared to their physically acceptable base features.
12For example, suppose a contingentist categoricalist Humean wants to take a non-reductive physicalist
approach to the problem of higher-level causation, and so aims (as I will expand on below) to identify
every token power of a token higher-level feature with a token power of its lower-level base feature. As
previously, such a Humean understands powers in terms of actual or potential instances of a (contingent)
regularity. Where the aim is to avoid overdetermination, the Humean may suppose, to start, that the
(relevant instances of the) regularities overlap, both with respect to the (single) effect, and with respect to
the (single) circumstances in which the two token features occur. If the Humean is moreover a reductive
physicalist, they may suppose that such overlap motivates identifying the token features at issue, and hence
the associated powers. If the Humean is a non-reductive physicalist, they can reject this identification of
features, on difference-making grounds (e.g., of the sort associated with Mill’s methods). Such a Humean
will suppose that attention to broader patterns of regularities can provide a basis for identifying token
powers of token features, even when the token features are not themselves identical. Whether reductive
or non-reductive, the contingentist categoricalist Humean can make sense of the claim that some, all, or
none of the token powers of token features are identical. This case is like the case of New York: if we can
make it (out) here, we can make it (out) anywhere.
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The threat of overdetermination posed by the problem of higher-level causation is avoided
by denying, contra all varieties of physicalism, that every lower-level physically acceptable
effect has a purely lower-level physically acceptable cause—that is, by denying Physical
Causal Closure. Rather, it is maintained that at least some higher-level features have
fundamentally novel powers to produce effects—powers not had by their physically ac-
ceptable base features, or (more weakly) had only derivatively by these base features,
in virtue of base features’ being preconditions for the emergent features which are more
directly implicated in causing the physical effects in question. Whether the effect in ques-
tion is a special science feature (S*) or is rather a lower-level physically acceptable feature
(P*), either way the rejection of Closure blocks the route to P ’s causing E by way of
causing P*.
The strong emergentist strategy for avoiding the problem of higher-level causation can
thus be put in terms of fundamentally novel powers, with Physical Causal Closure being
denied on grounds that either (a) lower-level feature P does not have the power to cause
the effect in question, or more weakly, (b) that while P does have the power to cause
the effect, P has this power only derivatively, in virtue of being a dependence base for
higher-level feature S, which more directly causes S* (if the effect is a special science
feature) or P* (if the effect is a lower-level physically acceptable feature). Implementing
either (a) or (b) requires that the powers of the higher-level feature satisfy the following
condition:
New Power Condition: Token higher-level feature S has, on a given occasion,
at least one token power not identical with any token power of the token
lower-level feature P on which S synchronically depends, on that occasion.
Suppose, for example, that the special science feature at issue is a state of being thirsty,
which in appropriate circumstances causes a physical effect—say, a physical reaching for
a nearby glass of water. On the assumption that the state of being thirsty is strongly
emergent, then the movement would not, contrary to the assumption of Physical Causal
Closure, have a purely lower-level physical cause; hence even if the physically acceptable
base feature in some sense causes the movement, this would only be in virtue of its being a
precondition for the emergent state which more directly causes the movement. The effect
is thus not overdetermined: even granting that the lower-level dependence base feature
does cause the effect, the causal relation here goes through the higher-level emergent
feature and its powers, so that there is only one causing, not two.
It is clear that satisfaction of this condition guarantees that S is both ontologically
and causally autonomous from P : since S has a token power that P doesn’t have, S is
distinct from P (by Leibniz’s law) and can do at least one thing that P can’t do, or in
any case cannot do in the same way as S.
1.3.3 Non-reductive physicalism
Like the strong emergentist, the non-reductive physicalist maintains that (some) special
science features are real, distinct, and distinctively efficacious with respect to their base
features. Problematic overdetermination is avoided, consistent with Physical Causal Clo-
sure, by denying Non-overdetermination, with the suggestion being that higher-level and
base features stand in one or other ‘realization’ relation that, while not identity, is inti-
mate enough to avoid overdetermination of the firing squad variety. A number of such
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relations have been proposed, including functional realization, the part/whole relation,
and the determinable/determinate relation. This seeming diversity hides a deeper unity
of strategy, however, which again can be put in terms of a certain condition on powers.
To start, the non-reductive physicalist maintains, as does the reductive physicalist,
that every token power of S, on a given occasion, is identical to a token power of the base
feature P upon which it depends, on that occasion. They moreover maintain that in such
a case the token powers of S are a non-empty proper subset of the token powers of P , as
per:
Subset condition on powers: Token higher-level feature S has, on the occasion
in question, a non-empty proper subset of the token powers of the token lower-
level feature P on which S synchronically depends, on that occasion.13
Satisfaction of the condition clearly blocks problematic overdetermination: when a
power of S manifests in a given effect on a given occasion, there is only one causing (as
between S and P ), not two.
Satisfaction of this condition also guarantees conformity to Physicalism, compatible with
both ontological and causal autonomy.
Let’s start with conformity to Physicalism. To start, note that the recipe for avoiding
overdetermination accommodates the core physicalist claim (Physical Causal Closure,
above) that every lower-level physically acceptable effect has a purely lower-level physically
acceptable cause.
13This approach to characterizing emergence of a physically acceptable variety (a.k.a. ‘non-reductive
realization’), is sometimes inaccurately called ‘Shoemaker’s strategy’ or ‘Shoemaker’s account’ of real-
ization, following Shoemaker 2000—inaccurately, since my 1999 paper (first written for a Spring 1998
seminar with Richard Boyd on naturalism, during my second year of graduate school at Cornell, and sub-
mitted to a Philosophical Quarterly competition later that year) was the first published paper presenting
and defending the subset-of-powers strategy for making sense of non-reductive physicalism. My paper
moreover highlighted that several accounts of non-reductive physicalism, which were apparently dissimilar
in appealing to different relations, had in common that the relations appealed to arguably satisfied (or
aimed to satisfy) the subset condition on powers, and hence were more similar than they appeared. Yet
more generally, my paper situated attention to powers as relevant to distinguishing reductive from non-
reductive versions of physicalism, and to distinguishing a non-physicalist form of emergence (i.e., ‘Strong’
emergence, as above) from any form of physicalism. The version of the proper subset strategy that I
endorse has certain advantages over Shoemaker’s—importantly, as I’ll rehearse down the line, it is not
required to implement the strategy that one accept Shoemaker’s (1980) view of properties as essentially
and exhaustively characterized by their powers.
The pedigree of the proper subset strategy ultimately traces back to John Heil’s 1995 NEH summer
seminar in the metaphysics of mind, which took place at Cornell following my first year of graduate school,
and which Heil graciously allowed me to attend. During the course of the seminar, Michael Watkins struck
upon the idea of treating the problem of mental causation by taking the powers of the mental feature (qua
type or token) to be a proper subset of those of its physical realizer(s) (qua type or token). The original
idea for the subset-of-powers approach to non-reductive realization is thus Watkins’s; however, he did not
go on to much develop his view, whereas both I and Shoemaker (who chaired of my dissertation) did so, in
parallel. Unfortunately, though I cited Shoemaker’s work in progress, he did not and has never cited any
of my work on this topic, which has, perhaps predictably, led to its being commonly assumed that he was
the sole original developer of the view. It didn’t help that the title of my 1999 paper (‘How Superduper
does a Physicalist Supervenience Need to Be?’) was less than informative about the key results therein.
Be all this as it may, I hope that those who are informed about this citation and priority issue will do
what they can to ensure that my contribution to the original and subsequent development of the proper
subset approach to realization is appropriately tracked.
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Moreover, imposition of the condition blocks all the usual routes to physical unac-
ceptability. The main concern about physical acceptability turns on the possibility that
higher-level feature S might be strongly emergent, such that, as above, either (a) P does
not have the power to cause the effect E in question, or (b) that while P does have the
power to cause this effect, this power is not identical with that had by S (it is manifested
differently, or in different conditions). Satisfaction of the subset condition blocks both (a)
and (b). Satisfaction of the condition also blocks the other live routes to physical unac-
ceptability, associated with S’s being non-natural (see Moore 1903) or supernatural: such
designations plausibly require the having of non-natural or supernatural powers, which
are ruled out by satisfaction of the subset condition (assuming, as we are, that the base
feature P has no such powers).
Now, as it stands (and remaining broadly neutral on the metaphysics of features) sat-
isfaction of the proper subset condition is compatible with S’s having a non-causal aspect
not had by P—say, a non-causal quiddity or an epiphenomenal quale. But, as discussed
above, and as is reflected in the dispute between strong emergentists and physicalists, any
non-causal aspects of S are irrelevant to broadly scientific goings-on: scientific truths do
not in any way depend on or otherwise track whether scientific features have non-causal
aspects (much less track how any such aspects are related). Hence that S has such as-
pects (whether or not shared by P ) cannot undermine S’s physical acceptability, given
P ’s physical acceptability.
This point bears emphasizing, since many have supposed—following the assumptions
of certain advocates of a powers-based approach to non-reductive realization (e.g., Shoe-
maker 2000 and ?)—that such an approach requires commitment to an account of features
on which these are essentially or exhaustively individuated by their powers. Hence Melnyk
(2006, 141–143) suggests that unless features are identified with clusters of token powers,
satisfaction of the proper subset condition will not guarantee conformity to Physicalism,
since such satisfaction will not guarantee that physically realized entities are constituted
by physical entities, or that truths about physically realized entities are made true by
physical goings-on. More specifically, Melnyk claims that if realized features have non-
causal aspects, then even though an entity’s having P entails that it has (bestowed upon
it) the token powers associated with having S, it won’t follow from satisfaction of the
proper subset condition that the entity’s having P constitutes its having S, or that the
entity’s having P (along with physical laws, etc.) makes S truly attributed to it. But
this is incorrect: truths about physical constitution or truthmaking, being broadly sci-
entific truths, are neutral as regards whatever non-causal aspects of features there might
be; hence the grounds of such truths must also be neutral on whether properties have
non-causal aspects. It follows that satisfaction of the proper subset condition suffices for
conformity with Physicalism independent of whether states or features are exhaustively
individuated by their associated powers.14
14Similarly for Melnyk’s other claim (138–140) that unless realized entities are identified with clusters
of powers, the condition’s satisfaction will not guarantee satisfaction of the ‘necessitation’ condition,
according to which a physically acceptable realized entity must (perhaps together with physical laws, etc.)
metaphysically necessitate the realized entity: “Why should it? Why assume that along with possession
of power-tokens of certain types there automatically comes possession of a property [. . . ] that would have
conferred them?” (140). Given that truths about broadly scientific entities are transparent to facts about
non-causal aspects of entities, from an entity’s possession of power-tokens of a type it does automatically
follow that the entity has the feature, whether or not features have non-causal aspects.
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The general pattern, blocking any route to S’s physical unacceptability, is as follows:
if P is physically acceptable, and every token power of S, on an occasion, is identical with
a token power of P , on that occasion, then any causal aspects of S are guaranteed to be
physically acceptable; non-causal aspects of S are irrelevant to S’s physical acceptability;
hence a realization relation satisfying the proper subset condition on powers guarantees
S’s physical acceptability, in conformity to Physicalism, independent of what account of
properties one endorses.15
Let’s turn now to the question of autonomy. Satisfaction of the subset condition clearly
accommodates ontological autonomy: if S has only a proper subset of P ’s powers, then S
is distinct from P , by Leibniz’s law. The strategy arguably also makes room for S’s being
causally autonomous, with the key idea being that causal autonomy does not require that
S have a distinctive power. Rather, it is enough that S have a distinctive set (collection,
plurality) of powers—that is, a distinctive power profile.
How might the having of a distinctive power profile suffice for causal autonomy? One
case for this appeals to difference-making or other ‘proportionality’ considerations, in
cases where S (or S’s type) is multiply realizable. suppose S is a state of feeling thirsty,
which causes an effect E—say, a reaching for a glass of water. Now suppose that S (or
another instance of S’s type, etc.) had been realized by P ′ rather than P . Would the
(or a) reaching still have occurred? Intuitively, yes, because the additional powers pos-
sessed by P , in virtue of which it differs from P ′—say, to produce a specific reading on a
neuronal state detector—don’t matter for the production of the (or a) reaching. Rather,
all that matters for this are the powers associated with S. That S’s distinctive power
profile contains just the powers crucial for E provides a principled reason for taking S to
be efficacious vis-a´-vis E in a way that is distinctive from P ’s efficacy vis-a´-vis E. Note
that nothing in this line of thought requires that one accept a difference-making account
of causation or relatedly, that one reject P as being a cause of E—indeed, physicalists,
who accept Physical Causal Closure, will plausibly maintain that P does cause E, either
directly (if E is a lower-level physically acceptable cause) or indirectly (via production
of a lower-level physically acceptable realizer or E). The suggestion is simply that at-
tention to difference-making considerations provides a principled ground for S’s being
distinctively efficacious vis-a´-vis E, in that S’s power profile tracks those powers that are
counterfactually relevant to the production of E.
Another case for taking distinctive power profiles to (at least sometimes) suffice for
causal autonomy appeals to the connection between sets of powers and distinctive systems
of laws (e.g., the special science laws governing entities of S’s type). Plausibly, systems
of laws track causal joints in nature. Correspondingly, S’s distinctive power profile is
indicative of a distinctive causal joint in nature. Causal joints may overlap—in particular,
in respect of S’s and P ’s token power to cause effect E. Still, if the joints as a whole
are different, this provides a principled basis for taking S to be distinctively efficacious
vis-a´-vis E, in that S produces E as part of a different system of laws than P .16
15It is also worth noting that in assuming that only powers are relevant to investigations into the physical
acceptability of features, there is no danger of ‘leaving out’ what is relevant to, e.g., qualitative mental
experience; for qualitative and other aspects of mentality do have causal implications (e.g., to produce
awareness of qualitative aspects in experiencing subjects), as per the rejection of epiphenomenalism.
16See Wilson 2010b for further defense of this claim.
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1.4 Strong and Weak emergence
The strong emergentist and non-reductive physicalist responses to the problem of higher-
level causation are the only responses aiming to accommodate the metaphysical emergence—
dependence with ontological and causal autonomy—of higher-level entities; and as just
argued, there are cases to be made that satisfaction of either of the associated conditions
on powers would fulfill this aim. Moreover, and independent of the specifics of the problem
(in particular, independent of the shared assumption that the base entities are physically
acceptable), attention to these conditions makes clear the relatively limited ways in which,
most crucially, the causal (hence also ontological) autonomy of a higher-level feature vis-
a´-vis its base feature may be gained. To wit: the feature may (as per strong emergentism)
have more powers than its base feature; or the feature may (as per non-reductive phys-
icalism) have fewer powers that its base feature. Since complete coincidence of powers
doesn’t make room for causal autonomy, these routes to emergence exhaust the options.
We may thus take the responses as exhaustive representative bases for two schematic
conceptions of metaphysical emergence. The first schema is that associated with strong
emergentism:
Strong emergence: Token higher-level feature S is strongly metaphysically
emergent from token lower-level feature P just in case for some occasion (i)
S synchronically depends on P on that occasion; and (ii) S has at least one
token power not identical with any token power of P on that occasion.
The first condition minimally specifies synchronic dependence; the second (reflecting the
New Power Condition) captures the comparatively strong sense in which an emergent
feature may be causally, hence ontologically, autonomous vis-a´-vis the lower-level base
feature upon which it synchronically depends.17
The second schema is that associated with non-reductive physicalism:
Weak emergence: Token higher-level feature S is weakly metaphysically emer-
gent from token lower-level feature P on a given occasion just in case (i) S
synchronically depends on P on that occasion; and (ii) S has a non-empty
proper subset of the token powers had by P , on that occasion.
Again, the first condition minimally specifies synchronic dependence; the second (reflect-
ing the Proper Subset Condition) captures the comparatively weak sense in which an
emergent entity is causally, hence ontologically, autonomous vis-a´-vis its base entity.18
17The schema is relativized to occasions, but it suffices for the strong emergence of S, simpliciter,
that the condition is ever satisfied; and it suffices for the strong emergence of the feature type from any
lower-level physically acceptable features that any token feature S on any occasion (either actual, or
counterfactually compatible with the actual laws of nature) satisfies the condition. These complications
won’t play a role in what follows.
18Again, the condition is relativized to occasions. If one wants to maintain that token feature S is
weakly metaphysically emergent, simpliciter, one needs to generalize the condition to apply to all relevant
occasions, as follows:
Weak emergence: Token higher-level feature S is weakly metaphysically emergent, sim-
pliciter, from lower-level physically acceptable features just in case for every occasion on
which S (actually, or counterfactually, compatible with the actual laws of nature) exists, (i)
S synchronically depends on some token lower-level physically acceptable P on that occasion;
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Each schema encodes a different way in which a higher-level feature might be de-
pendent on, yet ontologically and causally autonomous from, a base feature; and thus
is promising, so far as accommodating the motivations for emergence is concerned. And
again, attention to the available responses to the problem of higher-level causation, and
the associated relations between powers that might serve as a basis for dependent causal
autonomy, indicate that these schemas encode the only options for characterizing the
metaphysical emergence of higher-level, broadly scientific entities (henceforth, typically,
just ‘emergence’).
Let’s now turn to seeing how specific accounts of emergent dependence and emer-
gent autonomy, properly disambiguated and interpreted, aim to conform to one or other
schema. In what follows, I’ll usually leave off the qualifier ‘aim to’, since my primary goal
is not to assess the success of these accounts for purposes of characterizing emergence, but
to make explicit their underlying theoretical intentions for doing so. That said, as prefig-
ured, my discussion will track certain concerns about whether a given account presently
satisfies its aim. One final remark before getting started: reflecting the role of emergence
in the physicalism debates, accounts of emergent dependence and autonomy frequently
presuppose that the base entities at issue are physically acceptable; the morals to be
drawn, however, are broadly independent of this presupposition.
2 Emergent dependence
Four accounts of emergent dependence are on offer: material composition, modal covaria-
tion, causation or causal dependence, and functional or other realization. The first two are
not exclusive of the last two: effectively all accounts of higher-level emergence take both
material composition and modal covariation to be some part of emergent dependence.
Where accounts primarily differ, as we will see, is in the assumed strength of modal
covariation, and (relatedly) in whether broadly causal or rather realization-based depen-
dence is (tacitly or explicitly) assumed. As I’ll argue, accounts of emergent dependence
differing in these respects conform to either Strong or Weak emergence, respectively.
2.1 Material composition
Accounts of emergence typically suppose that special science entities (again: systems,
processes, particulars) depend on lower-level, ultimately physical entities at least in that
the former are exhaustively composed of the latter:
All organised [living] bodies are composed of parts similar to those composing
inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic
state; but the phenomena of life which result from the juxtaposition of those
parts in a certain manner bear no analogy to any of the effects which would
be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere
physical agents. (Mill 1843/1973, 243)
and (ii) S has a proper subset of the token powers had by P , on that occasion.
Further quantification over all actual or counterfactual (nomologically possible) tokens of S’s type would
be required to establish that S’s type was weakly emergent from (any) lower-level physically acceptable
feature types. These generalizations won’t make a difference what follows.
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The first feature of contemporary theories of emergence, the thesis of physical
monism, is a thesis about the nature of systems that have emergent properties
(or structures). The thesis says that the bearers of emergent properties are
made up of material parts only. It denies that there are any supernatural
components responsible for a system having emergent properties. Thus, all
substance-dualistic positions are rejected [. . . ]. (Stephan 2002, 79)
Indeed, the assumption of compositional dependence reflects the intended contrast
with dualist accounts on which higher-level features depend on the existence of physically
unacceptable entities (e.g., souls, entelechies, conscious or proto-conscious fundamental
particles). Compositional dependence is, however, compatible with either Weak or Strong
emergence, and indeed, with the absence of emergence, since it is a further question,
concerning any exhaustively physically composed particular, what features it has and
whether any of these are emergent in either schematic sense.
2.2 Modal covariation
A further common baseline assumption is that emergent features depend on base features
in standing in certain relations of (at least nomologically) necessary covariation, reflecting
that emergent features both require (for their occurrence) and are upwardly necessitated
by base features. So, for example, Broad (1925) maintains that emergent features of a
compound are functionally dependent on features of the compound’s parts (54-5), and
that emergent features are “completely determined” by such lower-level features, in that
“whenever you have a whole composed of these [. . . ] elements in certain proportions and
relations you have something with the [compound’s] characteristic properties” (64); van
Cleve (1990) concurs that “an emergent property of w is one that depends on and is
determined by the properties of the parts of w” (222). The holding of both directions of
necessary correlation may be expressed by (a version of) supervenience (see Kim 1990) that
I’ll call ‘minimally nomological supervenience’, according to which an emergent feature
(at least nomologically) requires some base feature, and a given base feature (at least
nomologically) necessitates any associated emergent feature.19
Understood as an asymmetric relation (see Kim 1998, 11), minimally nomological
supervenience distinguishes reductive from emergent dependence. Without further speci-
fication, however, such a conception is compatible with either Strong or Weak emergence.
Broad and other strong emergentists typically maintain that emergent features minimally
nomologically supervene on base features. And the schema for Strong emergence makes
sense of such claims: laws of nature, after all, express what broadly scientific entities
can do—that is, what powers they have; hence if an emergent feature has a power not
had by its base feature per (as Strong emergence), it is plausible to suppose that the
features stand in some sort of nomological connection (see §2.3). Minimally nomologi-
cal supervenience is also compatible with Weak emergence, for some relations satisfying
Weak emergence (e.g., the determinable/determinate relation) entail that the higher-level
entities supervene with metaphysical, hence with nomological, necessity (see §2.4).
It remains to consider whether strengthening of the modal covariation relations—
pertaining specifically to the strength of upward necessitation—distinguishes Strong from
19The notion of upward necessitation may be stochastic (see Kim 2006, 550); emergent dependence need
not be deterministic.
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Weak emergence. Indeed, many accept as characteristic of physically unacceptable emer-
gence that emergent features would supervene with only nomological necessity on base
entities, in contrast with relations (like identity or the determinable-determinate relation)
which plausibly preserve physical acceptability. So, for example, Chalmers (2006) says,
[C]onsciousness still supervenes on the physical domain. But importantly, this
supervenience holds only with the strength of laws of nature (in the philosoph-
ical jargon, it is natural or nomological supervenience). (247)
Van Cleve (1990) similarly characterizes emergence of the sort intended to contrast with
Physicalism:
If P is a property of w, then P is emergent iff P supervenes with nomological
necessity, but not with logical necessity, on the properties of the parts of w.
(222)
Though common, the supposition that Strong and Weak emergence contrast with re-
spect to modal strength of dependence relation is problematic, for two reasons. First, a
physically acceptable feature might supervene with only nomological necessity on a physi-
cally acceptable base feature. For example, the subset condition in Weak emergence could
be satisfied even if features are essentially individuated by non-causal quiddities and only
contingently associated with their actual powers. Second, a physically unacceptable fea-
ture might supervene with metaphysical necessity on a physically acceptable base feature
(see Wilson 2005). This would be the case if, for example, a consistent Malbranchean
God brought about certain higher-level features upon the occasion of certain lower-level
features in every possible world; or if features are essentially constituted by (all) the laws
of nature into which they directly or indirectly enter; or if some strongly emergent fea-
tures are grounded in non-physical interactions, and all the fundamental interactions are
unified.
These considerations lead to a dilemma for anyone aiming to distinguish physically
acceptable from unacceptable emergence by appeal to modal correlations alone. Those
characterizing strong emergence in terms of mere nomological supervenience sometimes
reject counter-cases whereby Strong emergent features supervene with metaphysical ne-
cessity on base properties, as violating Hume’s Dictum, according to which there are no
metaphysically necessary connections between (wholly) distinct entities. As it happens,
Strong emergent features need not be wholly distinct from base features (see Stoljar 2007),
and in any case post-Humean reasons for believing Hume’s Dictum are in short supply (see
Wilson 2010c, Wilson 2010a, Wilson Forthcoming, ?). But suppose that Hume’s Dictum
is accepted, and grant that it ensures that Stong emergent dependence holds with only
nomological necessity. It remains, as per the first counter-case, that physically acceptable
features might supervene on base features with only nomological necessity—if, as above,
features are essentially individuated by non-causal quiddities, not powers. To block this
case, non-causal quiddities must be rejected as individuated of powers. But—here’s the
dilemma—proponents of Hume’s Dictum arguably must (and typically do) accept non-
causal quiddities as essentially individuating features, since after all (as per their denial
that there are no metaphysically necessary causal connections) they cannot take features
to be essentially individuated by powers. The means of blocking the two counter-cases are
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thus incompatible with each other, in which case a modal characterization of the distinc-
tion between physically acceptable and unacceptable emergence cannot be maintained,
even if one is willing to commit to certain controversial metaphysical theses.
Moving forward, it’s worth noting that, though covariation accounts officially aim to
characterize emergent dependence in purely correlation terms, they rely for their plausibil-
ity on the underlying contrast between certain nomological relations (e.g., causation) and
certain metaphysical relations (e.g., the determinable/determinate relation). The next
two proposals each cash out emergent dependence by explicit appeal to such relations, so
as to both plausibly and determinately target either Strong or Weak emergence.
2.3 Causation or causal dependence
Yablo (1992) notes “a subtle interpretive question about supervenience”, according to
which
On the emergence interpretation, a thing’s physical properties are metaphys-
ically prior to its mental properties and bring them into being. To caricature
emergentism just slightly, supervenience is a kind of “supercausation” which
improves on the original in that supercauses act immediately and metaphysi-
cally guarantee their supereffects [. . . ]. (256-7)
The suggestion that emergent dependence is in some sense causal ranges back to Mill
(1843/1973), the father of British Emergentism. Here it is important to be clear con-
cerning how emergent features are considered causally dependent on base features. Mill’s
discussion initially focuses on a distinction between ‘homopathic’ and ‘heteropathic’ ef-
fects of a composite entity, where the former but not the latter effects are broadly additive
combinations of effects of the sort that would have been produced were the component
entities acting separately. Such a conception of emergence aims ultimately to characterize
emergent autonomy in terms of a failure of additivity of causal influences, where such
failure, in turn, is criterial of the composite entity’s having a new power (to produce the
heteropathic effect); see McLaughlin 1992. Hence it is ultimately not (heteropathic) ef-
fects, but rather features of complex entities having powers to produce such effects, which
are emergent by Mill’s lights. (See §3.3.1.)
That said, the question remains whether emergence of such features might itself be
a causal phenomenon. Indeed, there are two ways in which emergent features might
be causally dependent on base features. First, base features might act as synchronic
nomologically necessary preconditions for the operation, or coming into play, of certain
nomological features—i.e., fundamental forces or interactions—associated in turn with
new powers; even if the relation here is not causation as traditionally understood, it
nonetheless involves broadly causal lawful dependence (see Wilson 2002). This is the
sort of causal dependence that is generally operative in British Emergentist accounts.
Second, base features might more straightforwardly cause emergent features, as some
contemporary emergentists (O’Connor 1994, O’Connor and Wong 2005) suppose. The
two approaches (causal dependence vs. causation) are close variants, with the primary
difference being that, if one supposes that causation is diachronic, one might further
suppose that emergence is diachronic (as do O’Connor and Wong).
Whether emergent dependence is synchronic or diachronic, a conception in terms of
causation or causal dependence will make good sense of Strong emergence. Either way
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an emergent feature has powers different from its base features: if caused, because effects
typically have powers different from those of their causes; if causally dependent, because
the operation of new fundamental forces or interactions serves as a (perhaps partial)
ground for the having of new powers. The precise nature of the ground for the new powers
varies depending on the preferred account of causal autonomy (see §1.3 and discussion in
§3 and §4.1).
Seeing how causation and causal dependence make sense of Strong emergence sheds
light on Kim’s (2006, 558) claim that “the emergence relation from [P ] to S cannot prop-
erly be viewed as causal”. Kim asks, rhetorically, “How can there be a causal chain from
[e.g.] pain to the hand motion that is separate and independent from the physical causal
chain from the neural state to the motion of the hand?” (fn.7). This would indeed be
strange against the assumption of Physicalism, and the associated closure claim that ev-
ery lower-level physically acceptable effect has a purely lower-level physically acceptable
cause; however, the strong emergentist’s strategy encoded in Strong emergence just is to
deny the closure claim, rather maintaining that the production of some physically accept-
able effect requires (the manifestation of) powers not had by any lower-level physically
acceptable feature. That said, Kim is clearly right that causation and causal dependence
cannot characterize physically acceptable emergence, since such a nomologically genera-
tive connection does not ensure that the powers of emergent and lower-level features stand
in the proper subset relation requisite for Weak emergence.
2.4 Non-reductive realization
The second metaphysically robust notion of emergent dependence is in terms of real-
ization. While there are many accounts of this notion, all have in common the aim of
characterizing a realized entity as ‘nothing over and above’ its realizing entity (or en-
tities), compatible (given the physical acceptability of base entities) with Physicalism.
Some physicalists moreover think that such nothing over-and-aboveness is compatible
with a realized feature’s being emergent. Hence Gillett (2002b) sees the project of estab-
lishing the possibility of emergence as “deeply interwoven with the project of vindicating
non-reductive physicalism as a viable position” (102).
A realization-based conception of emergent dependence is indeed well-suited for phys-
icalist purposes, in that the standard accounts of realization each have understandings on
which their holding guarantees satisfaction of the conditions of Weak emergence. Here I
consider a representative sample.
First, consider a ‘functionalizability’ account, according to which realized features are
second-order features, having causal roles played by the lower-level features that realize
them on a given occasion (see Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974, Papineau 1993, Antony and
Levine 1997, Melnyk 2003, and others). Now, to be associated with a distinctive causal
role is just to be associated with a distinctive set of powers; hence if the distinctive
causal role of a realized feature is, on a given occasion, played by a lower-level realizing
feature, every token power of the higher-level feature, on that occasion, will be numerically
identical with a token power of the feature upon which it synchronically depends, on that
occasion. This much suffices, as previously argued, for the physical acceptability of a
functionally realized feature, as per Physicalism. Still, one might think that functional
realization is incompatible with Weak emergence, on grounds that a functionally realized
feature inherits all of the token powers of its realizing feature:
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A functional reduction of pain has the following causal and ontological impli-
cations: Each occurrence of pain has the causal powers of its neural realizer;
thus if pain occurs by being realized by N , this occurrence of pain has the
causal powers of N . [. . . ] In general, if M occurs by being realized by N on a
given occasion, the M -instance has the causal powers of the N -instance (Kim
2006, 554).
Where a functional role may be played by multiple realizers, however there is a case
to be made that a functionally realized feature has, on a given occasion, only a proper
subset of the token powers of the feature realizing it on that occasion. To see this, recall
the analogy initially motivating functionism (see, e.g., Putnam 1967), to cases where
multiple hardware systems may implement the instructions associated with a given piece
of software. Here the realizing systems are similar in each having whatever powers are
needed to implement the software, but are different in having other powers associated with
their distinctive hardware bases. More generally, in cases where a type of functionally
characterized higher-level feature may be multiply realized, it is plausible that each of its
realizing types will have all of the powers associated with its functional role, and more
besides.20 Correspondingly, a proper subset relation will hold between the powers of the
realized type and those of any of its realizing types. This relation between powers will
hold on any occasion of realization involving tokens of the types; hence an account of
emergent dependence in terms of functional realization will conform to Weak emergence.
Second, consider powers-based accounts of realization (see Wilson 1999, Shoemaker
2000, ?).21
Property X realizes property Y just in case the conditional powers bestowed
by Y are a subset of the conditional powers bestowed by X (and X is not a
conjunctive property having Y as a conjunct).
Shoemaker moreover claims:
Where the realized property is multiply realizable, the conditional powers
bestowed by it will be a proper subset of the sets bestowed by each of the
realizer properties (8-9).
His motivations here parallel those used to motivate the same claim for functionally re-
alized properties. In brief, higher-level features are associated with distinctive sets of
powers; if such a feature is multiply realized, then its realizing types will share the pow-
ers of the realized type, but will differ in respect of further powers. This relation will
plausibly hold on any occasion of realization of tokens of the types; hence an account
of emergent dependence in terms of powers-based realization (and the associated ‘part-
whole’ accounts of type or token features that Shoemaker and Cla associate with their
accounts) will conform to Weak emergence.22
20See, e.g., the discussion in Antony and Levine (1997).
21Strictly speaking, in Wilson 1999 I do not endorse a powers-based account of realization, but rather
identify the proper subset condition as key to any account of (non-reductive) realization.
22Note that nothing in the preceding line of thought requires acceptance of any particular account of
the metaphysics of properties. As previously, the physical acceptability of a higher-level feature hinges
solely on the relations between its token powers and those of its base feature on a given occasion; as such,
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Finally, consider accounts of non-reductive realization in terms of the determinable/
determinate relation (see Yablo 1992, Wilson-1999-How-Superduper-does-a-Physicalist-
SV-need-to-be,Wilson 2009), the relation of increased specificity paradigmatically holding
between colors and their shades. Yablo (1992) expected the suggestion that, e.g., mental
features stand to their physical realizations in the relation that colors bear to their shades
to be met with some incredulity. One way to make his conjecture more plausible is
to put the point in terms of the causal powers of the properties involved (see Wilson
1999 and Wilson 2009). Consider a patch that is red, and more specifically scarlet.
Sophie the pigeon, trained to peck at any red patch, is presented with the patch, and
she pecks. The patch’s being red caused Sophie to peckafter all, she was trained to
peck at red patches. But the patch’s being scarlet also caused Sophie to peck—after
all, to be scarlet just is to be red, in a specific way. Nonetheless, Sophie’s pecking was
not problematically overdetermined. Plausibly, this is because each token power of the
determinable red instance is numerically identical to a token power of its determining
scarlet instance. Similarly, the proponent of determinable/determinate-based account of
realization maintains, for the case of S and P .
Again, one might be concerned that such an account of realization is incompatible with
Weak emergence, on grounds that instances of determinables and associated determinates
are token-identical (see MacDonald and MacDonald 1986 and Ehring 1996); for in that
case a higher-level feature will inherit all of the token powers of the feature that realizes it
on that occasion. But here too, there is a case to be made that instances of determinables
have only a proper subset of the token powers of the features that determine them on
a given occasion. Plausibly, a given determinable will be associated with a distinctive
set of powers; moreover, this determinable will typically be ‘multiply determined’ by
associated determinates; distinct determinates of the determinable will share the powers
of the determinable, but will differ in respect of other of their powers. Moreover, insofar
as determinables are distinctively unspecific, this characteristic should be preserved in
their instances; but if a determinable token is identical with a determinate token on a
given occasion, the former have all the token powers of the latter, and this distinctive lack
of specificity will be lost. This provides another reason to suppose that a determinable
token will have only a proper subset of the powers of their associated determinate token
on any given occasion, in conformity with Weak emergence.
2.5 Results
We have arrived at the following results concerning accounts of emergent dependence:
∼ Conceptions of emergent depenent in terms of material composition are compatible
with either Weak or Strong emergence, as well as with ontological reduction.
∼ Conceptions in terms of asymmetrical minimally nomological supervenience rule out
ontological reduction, and are compatible with either Weak or Strong emergence.
∼ Conceptions in terms of mere nomological supervenience aim to conform only to
Strong emergence, and conceptions in terms of metaphysical supervenience aim to
issues of physical realization are independent of whether features have non-causal quiddities; and one may
correspondingly also maintain that issues of physical realization are independent of whether the actual
powers of a given feature are essentially or exhaustively individuative of it.
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conform only to Weak emergence; however, there are cases to be made that either
strength of modal correlation is compatible with either schema; blocking all the cases
require endorsing controversial theses (the rejection of quiddities, Hume’s dictum)
which appear to be incompatible.
∼ Conceptions in terms of causation and causal dependence aim to conform to Strong
emergence.
∼ Conceptions in terms of realization aim to conform to Weak emergence.
3 Emergent autonomy: metaphysical conceptions
I turn now to considering metaphysical accounts of emergent autonomy in light of the two
schemas for emergence.
3.1 Ontological and causal autonomy
Causal autonomy (distinctive efficacy) guarantees ontological autonomy (distinctness), by
Leibniz’s law. But for reasons previously noted, ontological autonomy does not guarantee
causal autonomy. Causal autonomy is necessary, however, for vindicating the ontological
and causal autonomy of special science entities, and relatedly, for solving the problem
of higher-level causation in a way preserving both the dependence and the distinctive
efficacy of higher-level entities. Hence an account of metaphysical emergence aiming to
accomplish these goals must do so in virtue of causal differences between higher-level
and base features, rather than in virtue of any bare ontological differences there may be
between these features.
This observation is crucial in appropriately interpreting accounts of emergent auton-
omy. Consider, for example, the conception of emergent entities as being new or genuinely
novel with respect to their base entities:
[Emergence involves] a new kind of relatedness (Morgan 1923, 19)
[Emergence involves] a new quality [. . . ] distinctive of the higher-complex
(Alexander 1920, 45)
[A]t each new level of complexity entirely new properties appear (Anderson
1972, 393)
What seems to be central to our conception of emergent phenomena is the
idea that something genuinely novel is present in the emergent entity that is
not present in entities that are prior to it (Humphreys 1996, 53)
All such conceptions need to make explicit that the novelty/difference at issue has causal
as well as ontological implications. Note that mere adherence to Alexander’s Dictum
(a.k.a. the Eleatic Principle)—that real (broadly scientific) properties have powers—will
not in itself establish that a novel/different feature has the desired causal autonomy. A
stronger conception of emergent autonomy is needed, establishing that novel/different
emergent features have either powers or power profiles different from those had by their
base features.
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Here I will consider five common ways in which emergentists fill in the notions of
novelty/difference so as to gain causal as well as ontological autonomy, by appeal to: (1)
fundamental powers, forces, laws; (2) non-additivity of effects; (3) downward efficacy; (4)
imposition of lower-level constraints; and (5) multiple realizability and its variants. As we
will see, individual variants on these strategies aim to characterize emergent autonomy as
involving either fundamental or non-fundamental novelty/difference, along lines encoded
in Strong and Weak emergence, respectively.
3.2 Fundamental powers, forces, laws
The notions of ontological novelty or difference are sometimes supplemented by appeal to
fundamentality (ontological basicness):
A fundamental property is an ontologically basic property of a basic entity
[. . . ] An ontologically-emergent property is an ontologically basic property of
a complex entity. (Cunningham 2001, S67)
[Emergence involves] a fundamentally new kind of feature. (O’Connor and
Wong 2005, 665)
My central thesis is this: that there is ontological emergence is the claim that
some things which are fundamental are not ontologically independent. (Barnes
2012, 882)
An appeal to fundamentality is in the right direction, but still does not make the requisite
causal implications explicit, since a feature might be fundamentally new in having a
fundamentally new non-causal quiddity.
It is appropriate, then, that accounts of emergent autonomy as involving fundamental
novelty/difference typically take this more specifically to involve fundamentally new pow-
ers, forces, or laws.23 Such conceptions are characteristic of British Emergentism as “the
doctrine that there are fundamental powers to influence motion associated with types of
structures of particles that compose certain chemical, biological, and psychological kinds”
(McLaughlin 1992, 52). As McLaughlin goes on to note, these powers were typically taken
to be powers to “generate fundamental forces not generated by any pairs of elementary
particles” (71). Relatedly, British Emergentists commonly took emergent features to be
governed by fundamental laws (tracking or otherwise associated with the having of new
powers to produce fundamental forces, etc.). Hence Broad (1925) says:
[T]he law connecting the properties of silver-chloride with those of silver and
of chlorine and with the structure of the compound is, so far as we know, an
unique and ultimate law. (Broad, 64-5)
Appeal to fundamentally new powers, forces, or laws is similarly a theme in contempo-
rary accounts of emergent autonomy. So, for example, Silberstein and McGeever (1999)
understand emergent features as having irreducible causal capacities (that is, fundamen-
tally new powers):
23Barnes’s (2012) conception just in terms of fundamentality and dependence is an exception, and is
consequently overly general.
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Ontologically emergent features are features of systems or wholes that possess
causal capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic causal capacities of the
parts nor to any of the (reducible) relations between the parts. (186)
O’Connor and Wong (2005) similarly make explicit that emergent features are fundamen-
tally new specifically in having new causal capacities:
[A]s a fundamentally new kind of feature, [an emergent feature] will confer
causal capacities on the object that go beyond the summation of capacities
directly conferred by the objects microstructure. (665)
And reflecting that powers are plausibly grounded in fundamental forces/interactions,
Wilson (2002) offers a fundamental interaction-relative account of emergence, according
to which (in present terms) a dependent higher-level feature S is strongly emergent from
its base feature P , relative to a set of fundamental interactions F , just in case S has (on
an occasion, etc.) a token power different from any token powers of P grounded only in
forces/interactions in F .
Accounts on which emergent autonomy involves fundamentally new powers, forces
or laws all conform to Strong, and not Weak emergence. Accounts on which emergent
features have fundamentally new powers explicitly do so, and the other accounts implicitly
do so, since these accounts entail that emergent features will have new powers to generate
fundamental forces/interactions, and in virtue of which they will enter into fundamental
laws.
3.2.1 The flip side: failure of realizability
Under the rubric of emergent autonomy as involving fundamental powers, forces, or laws
we may also place negative conceptions of emergent autonomy as involving a failure of
realizability. So, for example, Kim (2006) identifies irreducibility of emergents as a nec-
essary condition of emergence, where this is understood in terms of failure of functional
realizability:
Property M is emergent from a set of properties N1, . . . , Nn only if M is not
functionally reducible with the set of the Ns as its realizer. (555)24
As above (§2.4), standard accounts of (non-reductive) realization all guarantee satis-
faction of the condition, in Weak emergence, that the token powers of emergent and base
features stand in the proper subset relation. Putting aside epiphenomenalism, then, an
account of emergent autonomy as involving failure of (any such account of) realization
will entail that an emergent entity has a new power, as per Strong emergence.
3.3 Non-additivity
Mill characterized emergent autonomy in terms of a failure of causal additivity. As we’ll
shortly see (§3.3.1), in the British Emergentist tradition such appeals are aimed at provid-
ing a (negative) metaphysical criterion for fundamental powers (and associated forces or
laws); such conceptions of emergent autonomy thus conform to Strong emergence. As we’ll
24Note that Kim here, somewhat uncharacteristically, takes the ‘one-many’ perspective on emergence.
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also see, however, certain contemporary understandings of non-additivity, as grounded in
non-linearity associated with, e.g., chaotic dynamical systems (§3.3.2), or in powers that
latently exist at the microphysical level (§3.3.3), have been associated with Weak emer-
gence. I’ll address each of these approaches, in turn.25
3.3.1 Non-additivity as a criterion for fundamentality
As previously discussed, Mill (“On the Composition of Causes”, 1843/1973) distinguishes
two types of effects of joint or composite causes. ‘Homopathic’ effects conform to the
principle of ‘composition of causes’ in being (in some sense) mere sums of the effects of
the component causes when acting in relative isolation, as when the weight of two massy
objects on a scale is the scalar sum of their individual weights, or when the joint operation
of two forces conforms to vector addition in bringing an object to the same place it would
have ended up, had the forces operated sequentially. ‘Heteropathic’ effects violate the
principle in not being mere sums in the previous sense, and are therefore indicative of the
operation of new laws. Mill says:
This difference between the case in which the joint effect of causes is the sum
of their separate effects, and the case in which it is heterogeneous to them;
between laws which work together without alteration, and laws which, when
called upon to work together, cease and give place to others; is one of the
fundamental distinctions in nature. (408–409)
And he offers chemical compounds and living bodies as entities that are capable of pro-
ducing heteropathic effects.
Mill did not use the term ‘emergence’ (evidently Lewes 1875 first did so), but his
notion of heteropathic effects serves as a basis for characterizing Strong emergence. To
start: given the reciprocal connection between powers and effects, to say that an effect of
a feature of a composite entity is non-additive, relative to effects of features of the parts
acting separately, is just to say that the higher-level feature has a power not had by its
lower-level base features when in additive combination (taking the many-one perspective)
or, equivalently, that the higher-level feature has a power not had by its relational lower-
level base feature (taking the one-one perspective). Mill himself moves seamlessly from
talk of heteropathic effects to talk of new properties of and laws governing entities capable
of causing such effects:
[W]here the principle of Composition of Causes [. . . ] fails [. . . ] the concur-
rence of causes is such as to determine a change in the properties of the body
generally, and render it subject to new laws, more or less dissimilar to those
to which it conformed in its previous state (435).
Both Mill’s reference to “new laws” and his taking such cases to contrast with “the
extensive and important class of phenomena commonly called mechanical” indicate that
Mill’s appeal to non-additivity of effects is aimed at identifying a criterion for a higher-
level feature’s having a new fundamental power, enabling it (or its possessing “body”) to
25See Wilson 2013 for a fuller discussion of the bearing of non-linearity or non-additivity on metaphysical
emergence.
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override the usual composition laws in the production of certain effects. As McLaughlin
(1992) notes, “Mill holds that collocations of agents can possess fundamental force-giving
properties” (65). All this is in conformity with Strong, and not Weak, emergence.
Most other British Emergentists followed Mill in characterizing emergent autonomy
as involving violations of broadly additive composition laws, including Alexander (1920),
who characterized emergent properties as having powers to produce heteropathic effects;
Morgan (1923), who contrasted resultant with emergent features as being “additive and
subtractive only”; and Broad (1925), who offered scalar and vector addition as paradigms
of the compositional principles whose violation was characteristic of emergence. An in-
teresting exception to this rule is found in Lewes’ (1875) characterization of emergent
autonomy as involving any failure of “general mathematizability”, with emergence being
correspondingly harder to come by. As in Mill’s case, and following the standard British
Emergentist conception of emergent autonomy as involving fundamental powers, forces,
or laws, these appeals to non-additivity are best seen as attempts to provide a substan-
tive metaphysical criterion of fundamentality, in conformity with Strong, and not Weak,
emergence.
3.3.2 Non-additivity and non-linearity
Though British Emergentists saw non-additivity as characteristic of Strong emergence,
some contemporary accounts of emergent autonomy (see Newman 1996 and Bedau 1997)
take non-additivity of the sort associated with non-linear features of complex systems
(e.g., being in the basin of a strange attractor) as motivating a conception of emergence
compatible with Physicalism. What accounts for this discrepancy in the status as physi-
cally acceptable, or not, of non-additive higher-level features?
We should start by noting that certain motivations for taking non-linear phenom-
ena to be physically acceptable do not establish this claim. Newman (1996), for example,
cites the supposition that complex systems are strictly deterministic in support; but strict
determinism of non-linear systems does not rule out such systems as being Strongly emer-
gent, for in the first instance such determination is a matter of nomological necessity,
and as previously, all emergentists agree that emergent features (and associated powers
to produce systemic behaviors) are (at least) nomologically necessitated by base features.
Relatedly, that macro-states of non-linear systems are derivable from non-linear equations
and initial (more generally, external) conditions does not establish physical acceptability,
since it remains to consider the metaphysical basis for non-linearity (and associated equa-
tions). Bedau (1997) claims that features of non-linear systems are physically acceptable
because ‘structural’ (effectively: because they are features of relational lower-level enti-
ties); but given that non-linear phenomena do not consist solely in additive combinations
of micro-level goings-on, the claim that such features are merely structural needs to be
established, not assumed. What is needed to warrant taking non-linear phenomena to be
physically acceptable is specific attention to the metaphysical basis for the non-linearity,
and some argument to the effect that this basis does not involve new fundamental powers
(or associated forces/interactions or laws).
Along these lines, it is worth noting that some accounts of the metaphysical basis for
non-linearity are compatible with Strong emergence, contra Physicalism. Consider, for ex-
ample, cases where the non-linear phenomena involves feedback between the micro-entities
constituting the base, associated with strange attractors and other dynamic phenomena.
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As Silberstein and McGeever (1999) note, one metaphysical account of non-linearity (again
compatible with strict determinism) appeals to a kind of system-level holism:
What is the causal story behind the dynamics of strange attractors, or behind
dynamical autonomy? The answer, it seems to us, must be the non-linearity
found in chaotic systems. [. . . ] But why is non-linearity so central? [. . . ]
Non-linear relations may be an example of what Teller calls ‘relational holism’
[. . . ]. (197)
As above (§3.2), Silberstein and McGeever take the associated holism as indicative of
emergent features’ possessing fundamentally new powers (“irreducible causal capacities”).
Such an account of the metaphysical basis of non-linear emergence is again in line only
with Strong emergence.
Proponents of non-linearity as characteristic of Weak emergence have a different inter-
pretation in mind, typically illustrated by attention to one or more specific examples (often
involving cellular automata). The general moral to be drawn from these examples is that
(pace traditional appeals to failures of additivity) a metaphysical account of non-linearity
need not involve fundamental higher-level powers or laws, but rather only micro-level
goings-on (notwithstanding that the aggregative result of such micro-interactions can be
very surprising), compatible with Physicalism.
Granting this moral, a remaining, underappreciated, and more serious problem for tak-
ing non-linearity as characteristic of Weak emergence concerns whether the higher-level
features at issue are plausibly understood as being ontologically and causally autonomous
from their base entities, in having only a proper subset of the powers of their base enti-
ties. Indeed, both Newman and Bedau maintain that non-linear features are in-principle
reducible to micro-level phenomena, though Bedau attempts to ground a measure of
higher-level autonomy in certain broadly metaphysical constraints on the predictability
of non-linear and other phenomena supposed to instance weak emergence. We’ll consider
Bedau’s account of such autonomy down the line (§4.2). Here I want to focus on another
aspect of non-linear phenomena, also noted by Bedau:
[T]here is a clear sense in which the behaviors of weak emergent phenomena
are autonomous with respect to the underlying processes. The sciences of com-
plexity are discovering simple, general macro-level patterns and laws involving
weak emergent phenomena. [. . . ] In general, we can formulate and investigate
the basic principles of weak emergent phenomena only by empirically observ-
ing them at the macro-level. In this sense, then, weakly emergent phenomena
have an autonomous life at the macro-level. (Bedau 1997, 395)
That non-linear phenomena associated with complex dynamical systems give rise to “sim-
ple, general macro-level patterns” may indeed provide a basis for the ontological and causal
autonomy of the associated higher-level features, compatible with Physicalism, quite apart
from how such patterns may be discovered.
Here we are motivated to attend to a second way in which higher-level phenomena
may be ontologically novel or different—namely, as being non-fundamentally novel or
different. And given that this form of difference must have causal implications, if it is
to be characteristic of emergence, the strategy for establishing that features entering into
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higher-level patterns have the desired form of autonomy is clear: one must establish,
first, that the macro-level patterns are different from (in being, plausibly, more general or
less specific than) those at the micro-level, and second, that the correct account of this
difference entails that the target (token) higher-level features have, on a given occasion,
only proper subsets of the powers of their (token) base features, as per Weak emergence.
One strategy for establishing that the requisite proper subset relation is in place might
appeal to the higher-level features’ being functionally or otherwise multiply realizable,
and so having causal roles that are indeed more general than those of their realizers, in
being associated with fewer of the latter’s powers. Another strategy, which I will discuss
in §3.5, may be implemented even if a given non-linear feature is only singly realizable.
In any case, proponents of non-additivity as a basis for physically acceptable meta-
physical emergence need to establish that the requisite autonomy is in place, and, it seems
clear, should dispense with claims of in-principle ontological and causal reducibility. Such
claims of reducibility may be motivated by thinking that in-principle ontological reducibil-
ity is required for Physicalism; but this motivation is suspect, given the seeming viability
of the non-reductive physicalist’s strategy for resolving the problem of higher-level causa-
tion, encoded in the schema for Weak emergence.
3.3.3 Non-additivity and micro-latency
Yet another understanding of the source of non-additivity is as involving the manifesta-
tion of powers that are existent, but latent, at the micro-physical level. For example,
Shoemaker (2002) distinguishes between ‘micro-manifest’ and ‘micro-latent’ powers of
lower-level entities, and suggests that emergent features have (‘Type-2’) powers that are
latent at the micro-physical level:
When micro-entities are combined in an emergence engendering way, the re-
sulting object will apparently have two sorts of micro-structural properties.
One sort, call these provisionally Type-1 micro-structural properties, will con-
sist of properties that can be specified entirely in terms of the micro-manifest
powers of the constituent micro-entities together with how these micro-entities
are related–i.e., in terms of what could be known about them prior to their en-
tering into emergence engendering combinations. [. . . ] The other sort, which
I will provisionally call Type-2 micro-structural properties, will be proper-
ties that are specified in terms of all of the powers, micro-latent and micro-
manifest, of the constituent micro-entities. [. . . ] Type-2 micro-structural
properties, although they are micro-structural, will be emergent properties.
[. . . ] If emergentism is false, manifest causal powers are the only ones the
micro-entities have, and physical micro-structural properties are the only ones
macro-objects have—and the other properties of macro-objects are realized in
their physical micro-structural properties. (55)
The underlying suggestion here is that, while emergent features may be non-additive (have
powers to produce non-additive effects) relative to micro-manifest powers, this need not
impugn their physical acceptability; Gillett (2002b) offers a similar account as “vindicating
non-reductive physicalism as a viable position” (102). Interestingly, Shoemaker traces the
suggestion to Broad (1925), who seems to have taken the view that the powers of emergent
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features are micro-latent as a variant on the view that emergence involves violation of
composition laws and associated coming into play of ‘trans-physical’ laws, as per Strong,
and not Weak, emergence. So here again the question arises whether emergent autonomy
as involving non-additivity is or is not compatible with Physicalism.
In answering this question, we should first note that the mere existence of micro-latent
powers does not suffice to render emergent features physically acceptable, for proponents
of Strong emergence will generally agree that in some broad sense physical entities have
latent powers to bring about emergent features:
[I]t is true in an emergentist scenario that everything that occurs rests on
the complete dispositional profile of the physical properties prior to the onset
of emergent features. For the later occurrence of any emergent properties are
contained (to some probabilistic measure) within that profile, and so the effects
of the emergent features are indirectly a consequence of the physical proper-
ties, too. [. . . ] The difference that emergence makes is that what happens
transcends the immediate [. . . ] interactions of the microphysics. (O’Connor
and Wong 2005, 669)
Such a weak dispositional understanding of micro-latent powers is compatible with micro-
goings-on’ being preconditions for the occurrence of new fundamental powers, forces/interactions,
or laws at the higher-level, contra Physicalism. Indeed, Broad’s assumption that emer-
gence has anti-materialist implications indicates that he has such a weak dispositional
sense in mind, in allowing that micro-physical entities have latent powers that become
manifest when in emergence-engendering combinations. Physicalist proponents of micro-
latent powers as a metaphysical basis for failures in additivity thus need to identify a
more substantive understanding of micro-latency, capable of blocking a Strong emergent
reading of apparent failures of additivity.
The prospects for doing this are unclear, however. To start, it isn’t enough to specify,
as Shoemaker does, that the effects of micro-level dispositions also be micro-level, since this
is compatible with the conditions of manifestation of the micro-level disposition involving
physically unacceptable goings-on. Gillett (2002b) more explicitly recognizes the concern,
and attempts to block it, as follows:
In our broached scenario [. . . ] the fundamental micro-physical properties have
such conditional powers which they contribute conditionally upon instantiat-
ing certain realized properties. In such a case, a realized property instance thus
determines that one of its realizer properties contributes a certain power that
it would not otherwise contribute. It is important to mark the non-causal na-
ture of the determination exerted by the realized property in such a scenario,
for this suggests that there will likely be no new ontologically fundamental
forces (or other properties). The relevant realized property instance, ‘’H’, is
not causing a microphysical property instance, ‘P ’, to contribute certain pow-
ers. Causal relations typically are mediated by forces and/or the transfer of
energy—thus if H causally determined P ’s contribution of powers then there
might well be a new force. But in the scenario, H is exerting a non-causal
determinative influence. (113)
One problem here is that, even on the Strong emergentist interpretation of non-additivity,
the weak dispositional micro-latent powers will not be caused by the higher-level feature:
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new fundamental interactions do not cause, but rather enter into constituting, the new
powers for which they serve as a (perhaps partial) ground. The deeper problem, however,
is that Gillett is stipulating that, rather than explaining how or why, the powers occurent
in emergence-engendering combinations might not involve (either causally or constitu-
tively) any fundamental higher-level interactions or the like. The question remains: how
are we to make sense of the claim that such powers are compatible with Physicalism,
given that these powers do not make an appearance in the laws of fundamental physics
(which deals only with micro-entities in relatively non-complex combination) and given
that they cannot be understood as additive combinations of powers which do make such
an appearance?
What the proponent of micro-latency needs to do in order to establish that non-
additivity is compatible with Physicalism is to make a case that fundamental physical
laws might themselves entail violations in broadly additive composition laws when micro-
entities enter into emergence-engendering combinations. It is unclear how this can be
established however, since composition laws (incorporating, e.g., scalar and vector addi-
tion, along with other ‘ontologically lightweight’—boolean, mereological—modes of com-
bination plausibly preserving physical acceptability) appear to exhaustively encode the
broadly additive ways in which micro-manifest entities might combine while preserving
physical acceptability. At the very least, at present it remains unclear how a ‘micro-latent’
understanding of non-additivity is supposed to conform to the usual understanding of
Physicalism as the thesis that all broadly scientific goings-on are nothing over and above
the goings-on explicitly (and not just latently) at issue in fundamental physics.
Relatedly, there is reason to avoid characterizing physically acceptable emergence in
terms of micro-latent features. Traditionally, the dispute between physicalists (of all
stripes) and strong emergentists has turned on whether or not all broadly scientific goings-
on are nothing over and above goings-on that are manifest at the micro-level, when
micro-entities are not in emergence-engendering combinations. From this perspective, a
characterization of Weak emergence as involving micro-latent powers is not in the spirit
of Physicalism. As Clarke (1999) notes, if higher-level features have token powers not
identical with those of their base features . . .
. . . emergent causal powers would be due to (bestowed by) some macro-level,
structural properties possessed by the complex object [. . . ] It matters little
whether the macro-level properties that are acknowledged to carry emergent
powers are said to be physical properties or whether the emergent laws are
said to be physical laws; if there are emergent powers, then the kind of micro-
explanation that is the ambition of most physicalists, an explanation of the
behavior of all objects in terms of micro-level properties and relations and
micro-level laws, will be impossible. (309)
As such, it is no surprise that Broad did not feel the need to rule out the micro-latent
interpretation in taking apparent violations of composition laws to have anti-materialist
implications.
3.4 Downward efficacy
Many accounts of emergent causal autonomy require that such autonomy be specifically
with respect to lower-level goings-on. Hence Morgan (1923) says:
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But when some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say, at the level of
life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course
is different in virtue of its presence—different from what it would have been
if life had been absent. (15)
In a series of papers, Sperry (1969, 1986, 1976) suggests that conscious mental phenomena
are emergent in causally affecting underlying neurophysical states, as does Searle (1992).
More generally, as Kim (2006) observes, “downward causation is of paramount importance
to the emergentists. For they want to claim that the emergence of consciousness and
rational thought has made a fundamental difference to the world at the physical level”
(558).26
Unclarity over whether downward causation is compatible with Physicalism is a main
source of unclarity over whether emergence is compatible with Physicalism. There is,
perhaps, a prima facie appearance of incompatibility:
Of all the marks of emergence [downward causation] is the one which presents
the clearest and most direct challenge to micro-determinism. (Klee 1984, 58)
On the other hand, commentators disagree—sometimes as regards a single account—over
whether downward causation is so incompatible.
Sperry’s account is a nice case in point. On the one hand, Sperry (1976) speaks of
downward influence as involving higher-level powers:
The conscious subjective properties in our present view are interpreted to have
causal potency in regulating the course of brain events; that is, the mental
forces or properties exert a regulative control influence in brain physiology.
(44)
McLaughlin (1992) interprets such talk as committing Sperry to an account involving
fundamental configurational forces, hence as incompatible with Physicalism. On the other
hand, Sperry (1969) describes downward influence as analogous to that involved when the
atoms in a wheel must go where the wheel goes:
The subjective mental phenomena are conceived to influence and to govern
the flow of nerve traffic by virtue of their encompassing emergent properties.
Individual nerve impulses and other excitatory components of a cerebral ac-
tivity pattern are simply carried along or shunted this way and that by the
prevailing overall dynamics of the whole active process (in principle—just as
drops of water are carried along by a local eddy in a stream or the way the
molecules and atoms of a wheel are carried along when it rolls downhill [. . . ].
(532)
Schroder (1998) (following Klee’s 1984 suggestion) interprets this analogy as suggesting
that downward causation involves not new powers, but lower-level constraints: “we can
see what is wrong with a critique of emergentism that castigates it for assuming ‘config-
urational forces’ [. . . ]. Emergentists who adopt downwards causation as a criterion for
26That said, Kim thinks that the supposition of downward causation is problematic, for reasons we will
consider in §3.4.1.
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emergent properties need assume no such force. [. . . ] In order to produce live and mind-
ful beings, what is needed is not special laws but special structures that constrain the
sequence of possible events in special ways” (449). Searle’s (1992) account of “radical”
emergence, which is supposed both to involve new powers and to be no more physically
problematic than, say, liquidity, has produced a similar degree of interpretive confusion.
A plausible diagnosis of this confusion reflects that there are two ways for a higher-
level feature to be downwardly efficacious: one conforming to Weak emergence and one
conforming to Strong emergence. Confusion concerning Sperry’s and Searle’s accounts is
then plausibly located in these authors’ failing to be sufficiently clear about which form of
downward causation (hence of emergence) they have in mind, as with Sperry’s remarks,
above.
That downward causation may be interpreted in line with Strong emergence is clear:
one simply additionally requires that the new power associated with a Strongly emergent
feature be associated with the production of lower-level effects. Similarly for a version of
emergence discussed by Chalmers (2006) involving “a sort of incompleteness of physical
laws even in characterizing the systematic evolution of low-level processes” (248) and
which he thinks is best understood “as involving a sort of downward causation” (249).
Here the appeal to downward causation may be seen as providing an account of the specific
way in which Strongly emergent features are fundamentally novel or distinct.
Alternatively, downward causation may be interpreted along Weak emergent lines, as
involving the holding of certain physically acceptable constraints on lower-level entities;
here the appeal to downward causation may be seen as providing an account of the specific
way in which Weakly emergent features are non-fundamentally novel or distinct. That
said, as with appeals to non-linearity it is not obvious that such downwardly efficacious
features have the requisite ontological or causal autonomy, even granting that they inherit
the physical acceptability of their base features. To the prima facie contrary: might not
a given (token) feature of the wheel in virtue of which it rolls, on a given occasion, be
identified with a (token) feature of the relational lower-level entity (consisting of atoms
standing in atomic relation) constituting the wheel on that occasion? We will revisit this
issue when considering conceptions of emergent autonomy that more directly appeal to
the imposition of constraints (§3.5); there I will sketch a strategy that may work to gain
autonomy in at least some cases of constraint-based downward causation. The broader
moral at present is that additional work needs to be done to establish that features
associated with lower-level constraints are non-fundamentally autonomous in the way
required for physically acceptable emergence.
3.4.1 Kim’s concerns about downward causation
The latter issue is key to Kim’s concerns about downward causation and his associated ex-
clusion argument (previously discussed in §1.2), which aim to establish that non-reductive
physicalism must collapse either into reductive physicalism or expand into strong emer-
gentism (see, e.g., his 1989, 1993a, and 1998). As Kim correctly notes, blocking the
strong emergentist’s understanding of higher-level features requires accepting what he
calls the “Causal Inheritance Principle”, according to which every token power of a real-
ized property instanced on a given occasion is numerically identical with a token power
of the property instance realizing it on that occasion; and the challenge he has offered
to the non-reductive physicalist is to show how, if token higher-level features have no
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powers not already had by token realizers, the former may be ontologically and causally
(in particular, downwardly) efficacious. Certainly it is hard to see how such autonomy
might be gained if higher-level instances inherit all the powers of their realizing instances.
However, the explicit identification of Weak emergence as encoding the non-reductive
physicalist’s distinctive approach to higher-level causal autonomy at least makes clear
what the non-reductive physicalist needs to do in order to address Kim’s concerns about
downward causation. First, the non-reductive physicalist must establish that it suffices
for causal autonomy that a higher-level feature has a distinctive power profile, as per the
proper subset condition in Weak emergence; second, they must establish that at least
some higher-level features in fact have distinctive power profiles. As previously argued,
non-reductive physicalists do have resources along these lines, but whether these strategies
succeed is the subject of ongoing debate.
3.5 The imposition of constraints
Closely related to physicalist conceptions of emergent autonomy in terms of downward
causation are conceptions on which such autonomy is taken to reflect the imposition of
lower-level constraints (see Klee 1984, Schroder 1998, and Wilson 2010b).
To repeat, granting that features associated with the imposition of lower-level con-
straints conform to Physicalism, it is not obvious that such features have the requisite
ontological or causal autonomy; hence additional argument is needed to show that this
conception conforms to Weak emergence. I provide a detailed such argument, for a special
class of features associated with lower-level constraints, in Wilson 2010b. Here I sketch,
very briefly, the strategy of that argument.
To start, I consider the notion of a degree of freedom (DOF)—roughly, one of a minimal
set of independent parameters needed to characterize the states upon which the law-
governed features of a (token of a given type of) entity (including systems) functionally
depends.27 Attention to DOF is useful in the present context, because the imposition
of constraints at a lower-level generally affects, one way or another, the DOF needed
to characterize the higher-level entities whose existence is to some extent determined
by the holding of the constraints. Some sorts of changes in DOF resulting from the
imposition of lower-level constraints may not be indicative even of Weak emergence—for
example, cases where the DOF needed to characterize a higher-level entity (e.g., a rigid
body, or a molecule) are the same as those needed to characterize lower-level relational
entities realizing such higher-level entities, but where the latter DOF can take on only
constant or a restricted range of values. However, sometimes the imposition of lower-level
constraints involves not just reductions or restrictions of (values of) lower-level DOF,
but moreover eliminates certain lower-level DOF from those needed to characterize the
associated higher-level entity. This is the case, for example, with certain features of
quantum, statistical-mechanical, and complex dynamical entities or systems. (Note that
the present strategy, supposing it works, would vindicate accounts of Weak emergence
27So, for example, specifying the configuration state for a free point particle requires 3 independent
parameters (e.g., x, y, and z; or r, ρ, and θ); hence a free point particle has 3 configuration DOF, and a
system of N free point particles has 3N configuration DOF. And specifying the kinematic state for a free
point particle requires 6 independent parameters: one for each configuration coordinate, and one for the
velocity along that coordinate; hence a free point particle has 6 kinematic DOF, and a system of N free
point particles has 6N kinematic DOF.
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appealing to non-linearity.)
In such cases of elimination of DOF, I argue, there are reasons to think that the
associated higher-level feature satisfies Weak emergence, in having only a proper subset of
the token powers of the relational lower-level feature upon which it depends. As above, the
usual strategy for showing this appeals to S’s (functional or other) multiple realizability.
Attention to DOF suggests a means of establishing satisfaction of Weak emergence even
if S is only singly realized. suppose S is singly realized by a base feature P . Now, again,
what powers an entity has are plausibly a matter of what it can do; and the sciences are
plausibly in the business of expressing what the entities they treat can do. It follows that,
plausibly, what powers an entity has are expressed by the laws in the science treating it.
The powers of S are thus those expressed by the laws in the theory treating (constrained)
entity S, while the powers of P are those expressed by the laws in the more fundamental
theory treating the (relatively unconstrained) lower-level constituents of P—that is, the
constituents of P as existing both inside and outside the constraints associated with
S. Consequently, the laws of the theory treating S express what happens when certain
lower-level entities stand in relations associated with certain lower-level constraints, and
the laws treating P express what happens when certain lower-level entities stand both
in these relations and in other relations not associated with the constraints. Hence the
relational base feature P has more powers than S, and the proper subset relation between
powers in Weak emergence is thus in place.28
Of course, this is only a sketch of how higher-level autonomy may be gained via the
imposition of lower-level constraints, when these are associated with eliminations in DOF
(see my paper for details). The larger point for present purposes is that this or some other
work needs to be done if such constraints are to serve as the basis for Weak emergence.
3.6 Multiple realizability and its variants
As previously discussed (§2.4), non-reductive physicalists commonly appeal to multiple
realizability in service of establishing the ontological and causal autonomy of higher-level
entities. Related conceptions are in terms of ‘dynamical autonomy’, where micro-level
changes do not make a causal difference at the level of a system’s dynamics (Wimsatt
1996), and ‘compositional variance’, where the base entities of a given higher-level system
exhibit “a much greater degree of variance and fluctuation from moment to moment than
does the level of organization where [the higher-level entity] occurs” (Klee 1984, 48).
Why should multiple realizability, dynamical autonomy, or compositional variance
support ontological and causal autonomy? Making the case for autonomy is crucial,
since a now-standard reductionist strategy for accommodating multiple realizability and
its variants proceeds by identifying multiply realized types with the disjunctions of their
realizing types (see Kim 1992; seeClapp 2001 and Antony 2003 for arguments that disjunc-
tive features do satisfy the proper subset condition). Plausibly, instances of a disjunctive
type, on a given occasion, are identical with instances of whatever disjunct is instanced
28For example, suppose that P is a quantum relational entity, and S is a classical entity singly realized
by P . Then the causal powers of S include all those powers to produce, either directly or indirectly, effects
that can occur in the macroscopic limit. The realizing entity P has all these causal powers, and in addition
has all those powers to produce, either directly or indirectly, effects that can occur in circumstances that
are not so constrained, and in which quantum physics is operative—for example, effects occurring in
circumstances where no macro-entities can exist.
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on that occasion; hence disjunctive identification blocks conformity to either Strong or
Weak emergence.
That said, as above this reductive strategy for accommodating multiple realizability
and its variants may be resisted, in service of establishing that some higher-level realized
features are non-fundamentally novel or distinct, in a way having appropriate implications
for their causal autonomy. In particular, non-reductionists may understand multiple re-
alizability, and its dynamical and compositional variants, as tracking the higher-level
feature’s association with a distinctive causal role—that is, with a distinctive set of pow-
ers. Each lower-level realizer will have these powers (else it would not be a realizer),
and some others besides, reflecting lower-level causal potentialities which differ between it
and other lower-level realizers. Hence one may reasonably maintain that any instance of a
multiply realizable feature has only a proper subset of the token powers of the base feature
realizing it on that occasion, as Weak emergence requires. Correspondingly, conceptions
of emergent autonomy appealing to multiple realizability, dynamical autonomy and com-
positional variability are best understood as providing a plausible basis for establishing
that the proper subset condition in Weak emergence is met.
3.7 Results
We have arrived at the following results concerning metaphysical accounts of emergent
autonomy:
∼ Conceptions of autonomy in terms of mere ontological novelty/difference or fun-
damental novelty/difference guarantee ontological autonomy (distinctness) but not
causal autonomy.
∼ Conceptions in terms of fundamentality of powers, forces, laws (and relatedly, con-
ceptions in terms of failure of realization) aim to conform to Strong emergence.
∼ Conceptions in terms of non-additivity of effects aim to conform to either Strong
or Weak emergence, depending on whether the source of the non-additivity (non-
linearity) involves new powers. A pressing need here is for those taking non-linearity
as a basis for physically acceptable emergence to establish that higher-level non-
linear features are ontologically and causally autonomous from their base features,
in satisfying the proper subset condition on powers in Weak emergence.
∼ Conceptions in terms of downward efficacy aim to conform to either Strong or Weak
emergence, depending on whether the source of the downward efficacy involves new
powers, or rather merely involves the imposition of lower-level constraints. Here
too, it remains for those characterizing physically acceptable emergence in terms of
downward efficacy to establish that the requisite ontological and causal autonomy
is in place.
∼ Conceptions in terms of the imposition of lower-level constraints aim to conform
to Weak emergence. Here too, it remains for those characterizing physically ac-
ceptable emergence in terms of lower-level constraints to establish that the requisite
ontological and causal autonomy is in place (though see Wilson 2010b).
∼ Conceptions in terms of multiple realizability, dynamical autonomy and composi-
tional variance aim to conform to Weak emergence.
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4 Emergent autonomy: cognitive conceptions
Many historical and contemporary accounts of emergent autonomy involve appeals to
the failure to hold of certain epistemological, representational, or conceptual connections,
including unpredictability (?), in-principle failure of predictability or deducibility (Broad
1925), predictability, but only by simulation (Bedau 1997), and failure of representational
or conceptual entailment (Smart 1981, Chalmers 1996, Van Gulick 2001). Such accounts
are broadly cognitive in that they appeal to one or other failure on the part of creatures
like us (or suitably idealized versions of us) to recognize certain connections as holding
between certain higher-level and base features. For convenience, then, I will speak broadly
of such conceptions as ‘cognitive’ conceptions.
With few exceptions, cognitive conceptions of emergent autonomy aim to character-
ize metaphysical emergence. Typically, the relevant failures of cognitive connections are
supposed to be concomitants of novelty or ontological irreducibility (or both). This is char-
acteristic of, for example, Alexander’s (1920) understanding of emergent phenomena as
admitting no explanation because involving “brute empirical fact”; Kekes’ (1966) under-
standing of emergence as involving a priori unpredictability of (claims about) higher-level
features from (claims about) lower-level structure, due to novelty of higher-level property;
and Kim’s (1999) characterization of emergence as involving the joint failure of explana-
tory, predictive, and ontological reduction. Such conceptions may fall under the rubrics
of Weak or Strong emergence, respectively, depending on what ontological aspect is at
issue (as per §3).
Here I want to focus attention on accounts of emergence that are primarily or in any
case officially cashed in cognitive terms. Along the way, we will confirm both that those
endorsing cognitive conceptions typically aim to characterize metaphysical autonomy, and
that they take themselves to have reason to think this can be done in epistemological or
other cognitive terms. This is not true across the board, however; and I’ll close (§4.4) with
discussion of certain accounts of “non-reductive” physicalism which are explicitly cashed
in terms of failure of conceptual connection, and which are better seen as ontologically
reductive physicalist accounts aiming to make sense of our seeming inabilities to bridge
certain explanatory gaps.
4.1 Failure of in-principle deducibility
Broad’s official formulation of emergence (1925) is as follows:
The emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes, composed (say) of
constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other and that the charac-
teristic properties of the whole R(A,B,C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced
from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in isolation
or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A,B,C).29 (64)
29Note that Broad’s formulation appeals both to a ‘one-one’ and a ‘many-one’ perspective on the relata
of emergence, with an uncharacteristically flexible understanding of what features may enter into the
deduction, as going beyond the holding of pairwise (or other relatively non-complex) relations between
the composing entities, to include relations between lower-level relata in any other (possibly complex)
situations besides that at issue.
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Though this formulation is in epistemological terms, the discussion preceding the formu-
lation makes clear that Broad’s appeal to failure of deducibility aims to characterize a
metaphysical notion of emergent autonomy.
Broad begins his discussion of emergence by observing a distinction between two kinds
of inter-level (‘trans-ordinal’) laws, which distinction is also presented in seemingly epis-
temological terms. First are trans-ordinal laws holding “between physical properties and
properties at higher levels of the hierarchy which, while deducible in principle from a
theory of the physical properties alone, are not deducible in fact”. Second are trans-
ordinal laws that are moreover ‘trans-physical’, holding “between physical properties and
properties at higher levels which are not deducible, even in principle, from a theory of
the physical properties alone”. Broad’s official formulation of emergence thus obliquely
characterizes the holding of trans-physical laws, by reference to the associated in-principle
failure of deducibility that he assumes attaches to such laws.
In turn, for Broad, the existence of trans-physical laws has clear metaphysical conse-
quences. That Broad supposes that trans-physical laws are at odds with a “mechanistic”
(materialistic, physicalistic) view is some indication of this. Yet more telling are Broad’s
previously cited remarks to the effect that such laws are “unique and ultimate” (64-
5)—that is, fundamental. That Broad understands trans-physical laws as indicative of
metaphysical emergence is confirmed in passages such as the following:
On the emergent theory we have to reconcile ourselves to much less unity in
the external world and a much less intimate connexion between the various
sciences. At best the external world and the various sciences that deal with it
will form a kind of hierarchy. (78)
Emergence has implications for the unity of “the external world” and for the unity of the
sciences “that deal with” the external world. These are clearly claims about metaphysical
emergence; no failures of cognitive connection are ultimately at issue.
Similar remarks apply to other British Emergentists (e.g., Alexander), who, like Broad,
sometimes characterized emergence as involving a failure of predictability. More generally,
as McLaughlin (1992, 73) notes, “Emergentists often speak of emergent properties and
laws as unpredictable from what they emerge from. But [. . . ] the Emergentists do not
maintain that something is an emergent because it is unpredictable. Rather, they maintain
that something can be unpredictable because it is an emergent” (73).
4.1.1 Why (failure of) deducibility?
Since Broad’s concern is clearly metaphysical emergence and more specifically Strong
emergence (as involving fundamental laws and associated powers and forces), why does
he characterize emergence in epistemological terms?
I speculate that this reflects a felt need to clarify the notion of fundamentality at issue,
since certain ways of understanding this notion will not make sense of the characteristic
dependence of emergent phenomena. In particular, we cannot here understand ‘funda-
mental’ as ‘basic’, ‘independent’, or ‘axiomatic’. Relatedly, Broad may have wanted to
provide a substantive criterion of fundamentality, for purposes of applying his account.
Insofar as it will plausibly be the case that goings-on governed (in part) by fundamen-
tal trans-physical laws will not be deducible from goings-on governed by physical laws,
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it would be natural to look to deducibility as a means of clarifying the distinctively de-
pendent sort of fundamentality in Strong emergence. And Broad might reasonably have
thought that the immediate concern with characterizing metaphysical emergence in epis-
temological terms—namely, that creatures as limited as we are might not be cognitively
situated to recognize metaphysical connections that in fact exist—could be overcome by
additionally qualifying the failure of deducibility as being ‘in-principle’.
That said, the concern remains that even an ideal reasoner might fail to recognize
metaphysical connections that in fact exist, in which case the criterion will produce false
negatives. The procedure might also produce false positives, if certain uncontroversially
physically acceptable phenomena (say, complex dynamical phenomena, of which Broad
wasn’t aware) are in-principle as well as in-practice unpredictable (perhaps because the
sensitivity of such systems to initial conditions would require in-principle unavailable
resources for predictability into the indefinite future). Supposing so, then Broad’s criterion
will inappropriately deem some physically acceptable features of complex phenomena
Strongly emergent, hence physically unacceptable. In-principle failure of deducibility is
thus best seen as a good though not infallible epistemological guide to the metaphysical
features (involving fundamental powers and laws) characterizing Strong emergence.30
4.2 Failure of in-practice deducibility
Failure of deducibility or predictability also enters into some accounts of emergent auton-
omy aiming to characterize physically acceptable emergence (see Newman 1996, Bedau
1997, Rueger 2001); I’ll focus on Bedau’s work as representative in what follows. Bedau’s
(1997) account applies under conditions where a system S is composed of micro-level
entities having associated micro-states, and where a microdynamic D governs the time
evolution of S’s microstates:
Macrostate P of S with microdynamic D is weakly emergent iff P can be
derived from D and S’s external conditions but only by simulation. (378)
Derivation of a system’s macrostate “by simulation” involves iterating the system’s micro-
dynamic, taking initial and any relevant external conditions as input. A broadly equivalent
conception takes emergent autonomy to involve “explanatory incompressibility”, where
there is no “short-cut” explanation of macro-features of a system with emergent features
(see Bedau 2008). In being derivable by simulation from a micro-physical dynamic, as-
sociated macrostates are understood to be physically acceptable; as Bedau (1997) says,
such systems indicate “that emergence is consistent with reasonable forms of materialism”
(376).31
30That said, we will shortly consider whether in-principle failure of the broader notion of a priori
entailment might do better along these lines.
31As a referee pointed out, the failure of deducibility at issue in Bedau’s account(s) differs from that
at issue in Broad’s account in being diachronic (involving the evolution of the system over time), and
in that there might be such failures even in the absence of higher-level patterns. Still, to the extent
that such failures can be associated with macro-patterns (as per Bedau’s motivating examples from the
Game of Life, and as is reflected in his saying, as above, that such patterns emerge from “underlying
processes” (Bedau 1997, 395), and to the extent that diachronic emergence can be recast in synchronic
terms as involving (in a suitably broad sense) powers of configurations to give rise to such patterns, it is
worth considering whether and how Bedau’s account can serve as a basis for making sense of synchronic
metaphysical emergence of higher-level entities and features.
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Though Bedau sometimes speaks of such systems as “epistemologically weakly emer-
gent”, he is explicit that the emergence involved is also metaphysical. He signals that
“the modal terms in this definition are metaphysical, not epistemological” (1997, 379); he
states his aim of capturing a form of “metaphysical autonomy” (2002, 11); he emphasizes
that “weak emergence is not just in the mind; it is real and objective in nature” (2008,
444). Such claims would seem to be in tension with Bedau’s taking it to be characteristic
of physically acceptable emergence that “the macro is ontologically and causally reducible
to the micro in principle” (2008, 445); but Bedau thinks this implication can be resisted:
[W]eak emergence exhibits a kind of macro autonomy because of the incom-
pressibility of the micro-causal generative explanation of the macro structure.
Because the explanation is incompressible, it is useless in practice (except in
so far as it serves as the basis for a good simulation of the system). (2008,
449)
But it is unclear how usefulness in practice of explanations appealing to complex micro-
phenomena might be relevant to establishing the ontological and/or causal autonomy of
higher-level features, even granting that there is a metaphysical fact of the matter about
when a feature has or does not have a compressible explanation. Effectively, such facts,
though perfectly objective, are not of the right sort to ground the requisite ontological and
causal autonomy. There is a parallel here to the failure of mere ontological distinctness
to successfully capture emergent autonomy: what is needed for such autonomy is not
just some or other metaphysical distinction between the higher-level and base features,
but moreover one which plausibly serves as a basis for the causal as well as ontological
autonomy of the former.
There are, however, resources at least potentially available for making sense of gen-
uine autonomy in the cases Bedau aims to characterize, to which Bedau himself sometimes
gestures. We saw previously how Bedau’s (1997) observation that non-linear phenomena
may enter into “simple, general, macro-level patterns” might serve as a basis for estab-
lishing genuine emergent autonomy of a physically acceptable variety: if, more generally,
explanatorily incompressible phenomena enter into different, higher-level systems of laws,
this might serve to support an understanding of the associated features as having only a
proper subset of the token powers of their lower-level base features, and hence as genuinely
metaphysically emergent. Relatedly, Bedau (1997) observes: “Interesting macrostates [of
sort at issue in weak emergence] typically average over microstates and so compress mi-
crostate information” (377). If such compression of information involves an elimination in
degrees of freedom (see §3.5), this would provide another route to ontological and causal
autonomy. Alternatively, one might argue that compression of information is indicative
of multiple realizability and/or difference-making considerations, of the sort that, as we
have seen, plausibly motivate taking the requisite proper subset relation to be in place
(here Bedau’s 2002, 25 remarks concerning glider streams and their variable constituents
are evocative). Hence it may be that, while Bedau’s broadly epistemological account of
emergent autonomy does not itself serve to characterize metaphysical emergence, an ac-
count based on the relevant metaphysical features of “interesting” cases of explanatory
incompressibility may do so.
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4.3 Failure of conceptual entailment
Next, consider Chalmer’s notion of emergence in terms of a failure of a priori or con-
ceptual entailment. Chalmers (1996) characterized (physically unacceptable) emergence
in terms of a failure of broadly logical (conceptual) supervenience; in recent work (see
Chalmers 1999 and Chalmers and Jackson 2001) he has developed the suggestion that
one aspect of meaning is appropriately seen as tracking a priori connections. The notion
of a priori entailment here goes beyond deducibility or any other syntactic notion, rather
being linked to ideal conceivability and associated judgments of what is true in situa-
tions that are fully described along a certain (i.e., fundamental physical) dimension. So,
for example, Chalmers argues that, upon contemplation of a scenario in which exists a
creature functionally and physically identical to ours, an ideal reasoner would positively
conceive that such a creature might not be conscious; Chalmers moreover argues that
such ideal conceivability suffices for establishing the metaphysical possibility in question.
The precise nature of the possibility that is established by so-called ‘zombie’ arguments is
subject to different broadly dualist interpretations (including substance dualism, strong
emergence, and pan- or proto-psychism); but perhaps in combination with possibilities
established by other ideal conceivings (namely, that there could be no conscious entities
that were not dependently embodied, some way or other, at least in worlds relevantly like
ours) one might so aim to establish the truth of Strong emergence.
It remains controversial whether conceivability, even of the highly idealized and nu-
anced variety, suffices for establishing the truth of various possibilities (see, e.g., Block
and Stalnaker 1999); and the additional concern remains that such an idealized account is
unuseful for or irrelevant to our gaining insight into the structure of natural reality (see,
e.g. Melnyk 2008).32 Here I want just to call attention to two points. First, Chalmers, like
the other proponents of cognitive conceptions of emergent autonomy we have discussed,
does so in service of establishing the holding (or failure to hold) of a metaphysical de-
pendence relation. Second, supposing the strategy works and the appropriate conceivings
are in place, and putting aside the concern that even an idealized conceiver might fail to
discern certain Weakly emergent connections, the conception conforms to Strong, and not
Weak, emergence. Strong emergence involves fundamental powers (forces/interactions,
laws), and such fundamentality makes room for and sense of the failures of conceptual
entailment present even to idealized conceivers.
4.4 Mere failures in cognitive connection
Though most epistemological accounts of emergent autononomy are aimed at character-
izing metaphysical emergence (either Weak or Strong), this is not uniformly the case. In
particular, a not-uncommon way of formulating (a version of what is sometimes called)
non-reductive physicalism is as combining both in-principle ontological reduction with
failure of one or other variety of cognitive connection (see, e.g., Smart 1981 and Van
Gulick 2001). On such accounts, the ‘non-reduction’ at issue is understood in purely
epistemological terms, having no metaphysical implications; on the contrary, ontological
reduction is assumed. Metaphysically speaking, such accounts are best understood as
versions of ontologically reductive, not ontologically non-reductive, Physicalism, which
32See Biggs and Wilson in progress for presentation of an abductive framework for establishing modal
connections which can respond to these concerns.
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aim to makes sense of the presence and seeming intractability of various explanatory
gaps, and show that these do not pose a threat to such reductionism (see, e.g., Perry
2001). Such accounts may still be seen as addressing the initial motivations for attending
to emergence, of understanding and accounting for the appearances of dependence and
ontological and causal autonomy of higher-level entities, and associated hierarchical rela-
tions between (entities and features treated by) special and more fundamental sciences.
But the account they offer will be importantly deflationary, from a metaphysical point of
view, in denying that the appearance of autonomy is genuine (which is not to say that
the appearances themselves are not grounded in objective facts). Given the desirability of
providing a metaphysical ground for the ontological and causal autonomy of higher-level
entities, however, proponents of reductive accounts would do well to consider whether the
epistemological failures in question might, as with Bedau’s understanding of emergence
as involving in-practice failure of deducibility, be at least sometimes understood in terms
compatible with Weak, if not Strong, emergence.
4.5 Results
We have arrived at the following results concerning epistemological accounts of emergent
autonomy:
∼ Conceptions of emergent autonomy in terms of failure of cognitive connection typi-
cally aim to conform to metaphysical emergence.
∼ Conceptions in terms of in-principle failure of deducibility aim to conform to Strong
emergence, and may do so, assuming that there are no barriers to the in-principle
deducibility of Weakly emergent phenomena.
∼ Conceptions in terms of in-practice failure of deducibility (due to, e.g., explanatory
incompressibility) aim to conform to Weak emergence, and may do so if the assump-
tion of in-principle ontological and causal reducibility is dropped and the requisite
ontological and causal autonomy established.
∼ Conceptions in terms of failure of ideal conceivability aim to conform to Strong
emergence, and again may do so, assuming that there are no barriers to idealized
conceivability of Weakly emergent phenomena.
∼ Accounts of Physicalism characterized in terms of one or other failure of cogni-
tive connection coupled with ontological and causal reducibility fail to characterize
any variety of emergence; these are best seen as versions of ontologically reductive
Physicalism.
5 Concluding remarks
The problem of higher-level causation acts as a crucial constraint on feasible accounts of
synchronically dependent higher-level features; and though Kim presented the problem
in service of motivating a reductive physicalist stance, consideration of the spectrum of
available responses to the problem provides, more generally, a convenient way of seeing
what our options are, so far as making sense of the metaphysical emergence of higher-level
features is concerned.
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There are only two responses to the problem making sense of higher-level features as
both appropriately dependent on, and ontologically and causally autonomous from, lower-
level features. Correspondingly, there are only two schemas for metaphysical emergence,
which like the associated responses to the problem, turn on the two available ways in which
dependent higher-level features may be causally autonomous vis-a´-vis their base features:
either by having more powers, as per Strong emergence, or by having fewer powers, as
per Weak emergence. Again, the notion of power here is almost entirely metaphysically
neutral, requiring nothing much more than acceptance of the view that what entities can
do is a matter of what features they have. There are no other options for gaining the
causal autonomy of dependent higher-level features; hence these two schemas exhaust the
available options for the metaphysical emergence for such entities.
Flexibility remains in filling in the schemas, however, via suitable accounts of emergent
dependence and emergent autonomy. As I have argued, the many seemingly diverse ac-
counts of these notions, when properly understood, individually aim to conform to one or
the other schema. And though my task here was not to assess the success of these aims,
I have pointed out where more work needs to be done if certain accounts of emergent
dependence or autonomy are to satisfy the conditions of the intended schema. Perhaps
most crucially, it remains largely to establish that accounts of Weakly emergent auton-
omy in terms of non-linearity, lower-level constraints, and/or explanatory compressibility
characterize higher-level features as having the ontological and causal autonomy requisite
for genuine metaphysical emergence. That proponents have not realized that this work
needs to be done likely reflects, I submit, that the powers-based conditions on (broadly
synchronic, higher-level) metaphysical emergence have not previously been made fully
explicit.
Hence it is, I hope, that the two schemas do more than systematize and unify the
seeming diversity of accounts while explaining the variance vis-a´-vis Physicalism. Addi-
tionally, and perhaps more importantly, with the schemas on the table we are in better
position to consider and assess the available ways of filling them in, in ultimate service of
better understanding the potentially diverse—but after all, not all that diverse—structure
of natural reality.
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